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To The Late David Jones, Senior Attorney, Region 9, A Worthy
Litigator And Valued Colleague:
Administrative Decisionmaking by Judges in the United
States' Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator's Civil Penalty Assessment Process:
Whatever Happened to the Law?
By Richard R. Wagner*
INTRODUCTION
In 1940, Justice Felix Frankfurter admonished a federal appellate
court on the need to observe distinctions between the administrative
process and the judicial process. He observed that "[m]odern
administrative tribunals are the outgrowth of conditions far different
from those" of traditional Anglo-American court procedures, rules of
evidence, and judicial review.1 Justice Frankfurter noted that "[t]hese
differences in origin and function preclude wholesale transplantation
of the rules of procedure, trial and review which have evolved from
the history and experience of courts" to the administrative process.2
The Court emphasized that "[u]nless these vital differentiations
between the functions of judicial and administrative tribunals are
observed, courts will stray outside their province and read the laws of
Congress through the distorting lenses of inapplicable legal
doctrine.",3  This admonishment stands equally as a warning for
* Senior Attorney, Region 5. Any opinion expressed herein is that of the writer and
not necessarily that of the Administrator, Agency, or the United States.
1. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142 (1940).
2. Id. at 143.
3. Id. at 144.
anyone who is involved with any administrative process, and has
been recognized through theyears.4
This article argues that, in issuing his penalty assessment orders,
decision makers of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") Administrator have "stray[ed] outside their province
and read the congressional laws through the distorting lenses of
inapplicable legal doctrine."5  Without regard for the "laws of
Congress" which govern the administrative process, but, rather, using
the judicial process as a template, each of several Administrative
Law Judges ("ALJs") has acted as an independent trial judge issuing
final decisions, and the Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB"),
delegated by the Administrator his final decisionmaking authority,
has acted as a court of appeals, deferring to the decisionmaking of
each of the several ALJs. 6  As a consequence, instead of final
decisions of the Administrator manifesting the consistent application
4. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court thirty-six years later, noted the following:
We reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that differences in
the origin and function of administrative agencies 'preclude wholesale
transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial and review which have evolved from
the history and experience of courts.' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348
(1976) (citing FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940)). Two years
later, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated, this much is absolutely clear.
Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the
"administrative agencies 'should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and
to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their
multitudinous duties."' FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S., at 290, 85 S. Ct., 1467, quoting
from FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. 309 U.S., at 143, 60 S. Ct., at 441. Indeed,
our cases could hardly be more explicit in this regard. Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1978). In subsequent years, the
Court has continued to cite Pottsville Broadcasting Co. to support its holdings.
Sims v. Commissioner of Social Security, 513 U.S. 103, 110 (2000) ("it is well
settled that there are wide differences between administrative agencies and
courts."); Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344, 351 (1983) ("[t]he Board is not a court;
it is not even a labor court; it is an administrative agency charged by Congress with
the enforcement and administration of the federal labor laws.").
5. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. at 144.
6. The Board was created by the Administrator on February 13, 1992. Prior to his
creation of the Board, a Chief Judicial Officer ("CJO") was delegated authority by
the Administrator to issue his final decisions. Changes to Regulations to Reflect the
Role of the New Environmental Appeals Board in Agency Adjudications, 57 Fed.
Reg. 5320 (Feb. 13, 1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1, 3, 17, 22, 27, 57, 60, 66, 85,
86, 114, 123, 124, 164, 209, 222, 223, 233, and 403).
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of law, and the policy and discretion of one Administrator, these final
decisions have become ad hoc, their contents determined by the
personal views and predilections of whichever ALJ has been
assigned the case. As we shall later see, inconsistency in the
Administrator's penalty assessment has been a concern the
Government Accountability Office ("GAO") has brought to the
attention of Congress over the course of a number of years.
Part I of this article reviews relevant provisions of the United
States Constitution and of the laws of Congress which govern the
Administrator's civil penalty assessment process. Part II reviews the
rules promulgated by the Administrator, setting out the process by
which he exercises his authority to assess civil penalties for
violations of the various federal environmental statutes. Part III
reviews various decisions made on behalf of the Administrator. Some
concluding comments will follow.
I. THE LAW GOVERNING THE ADMINISTRATOR'S ASSESSMENT OF
PENALTIES
A. Constitutional Sources ofAuthority
The Constitution provides, "WE THE PEOPLE of the United
States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, . . . promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America."7 It further provides that [t]he Congress shall
have Power To ... provide for the common Defence [sic] and
general Welfare of the United States; ...And To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.8
Pursuant to this authority, Congress has passed numerous statutes
regulating human activity harmful to the environment of the United
States. With these statutes, Congress invested in the Administrator
the authority to assess civil penalties for their violation. In upholding
7. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
8. Id. art. I, § 8.
the constitutionality of the assessment of civil penalties by executive
authority under a statute passed by Congress to regulate safety in the
workplace, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the
remedial nature of the statute, and recognized that, by the use of
administratively imposed civil penalties "[b]usiness is encouraged to
comply with the law not only because that is what the law exacts but
because failing to do so will bring down on the activity or purse
noncriminal consequences."9 That decision incorporates a listing of
the numerous federal statutes then in existence, including
environmental statutes, in which Congress provided for the
administrative assessment of civil penalties against violators.1 ° In
upholding the Fifth Circuit decision, the Supreme Court stated, it was
within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters
exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obligations and
sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to
executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the
necessity of invoking the judicial power.ll
B. Federal Statutory Authority
1. The Federal Environmental Statutes
In various federal environmental statutes, Congress specifically
and exclusively authorized the Administrator to assess civil penalties
for their violation, and Congress specifically and exclusively
authorized the Administrator to determine the amount of civil
penalty, by considering or taking into account the particular penalty
criteria identified in the statute.12
9. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, U.S. Dep't
of Labor, 518 F.2d 990, 1009 (5th Cir. 1975).
10. Id. at 1003-09.
11. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Health & Safety Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 451 n.9 (1977) (citing Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 215 U.S.
320, 339 (1909)).
12. Clean Water Act of 1977 ("CWA"), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2000);
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1986 ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (2000);
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947 ("FIFRA"), 7 U.S.C. §
1361 (2000); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986
("EPCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 11045 (2000); Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. 7413(d)
(2000), invalidated by Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236 (1 lth Cir.
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For instance, "The Administrator may issue an administrative
order... assessing a civil administrative penalty" and, in determining
the amount of civil penalty to assess, "the Administrator . . shall
take into consideration" the statutory penalty criteria identified.13
And, "A civil penalty for a violation . . . shall be assessed by the
Administrator" and "[i]n determining the amount of a civil penalty,
the Administrator shall take into account" the statutory penalty
criteria identified.14 Congress further provides in these statutes that,
prior to assessing any civil penalty, "the Administrator" must serve
notice on the alleged violator of his proposed penalty order, and the
alleged violator's right to an opportunity for a hearing. For instance,
"An administrative penalty assessed under paragraph (1) shall be
assessed by the Administrator by an order made after opportunity for
a hearing on the record in accordance with sections 554 and 556 of
title 5 .... Before issuing such an order, the Administrator shall give
written notice to the person to be assessed an administrative penalty
of the Administrator's proposal to issue such order and provide such
person an opportunity to request such a hearing on the order."' 5 And,
"A civil penalty for a violation of section section [sic] 2614 or 2689
of this title shall be assessed by the Administrator by an order made
on the record after opportunity (provided in accordance with this
subparagraph) for a hearing in accordance with section 554 of title 5.
Before issuing such an order, the Administrator shall give written
notice to the person to be assessed a civil penalty under such order of
the Administrator's proposal to issue such order and provide such
2003), on the grounds that an administrative compliance order cannot be the basis
for the imposition of civil penalties; Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 ("SDWA"),
42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(g) (2000); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of
1972 ("MPRSA"), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (2000); and the Solid Waste Disposal Act
("SWDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (2000). By Executive Order 12580 (January 23,
1987), the President delegated his penalty assessment authority under section
109(b) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9609(b) (2000), to the
Administrator.
13. CAA § 113, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)- (e) (2000).
14. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(A) (2000).
15. CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2)(A).
person an opportunity to request, within 15 days of the date the
notice is received by such person, such a hearing on the order."' 6
2. The Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") is codified in Title 5
of the United States Code.17 Enacted in 1946, the APA sets a pattern
designed to achieve relative uniformity in the administrative
machinery of the Federal Government. It effectuates needed reforms
in the administrative process and at the same time preserves the
effectiveness of the laws which are enforced by the administrative
agencies of the Government.' 8
With exceptions not applicable to this discussion, Congress
directs that section 554 of title 5 "applies, according to the provisions
thereof, in every case of adjudication required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."1 9
Congress provides that persons who are subject to agency2° action
16. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(A).
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000).
18. Tom C. Clark, Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of justice, Attorney General's
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 5 (1947) [hereinafter Attorney
General's Manual]. This manual is "the Government's own most authoritative
interpretation of the APA" and one which the Supreme Court "[has] repeatedly
given great weight," as it "was prepared by the same Office of the Assistant
Solicitor General that had advised Congress in the latter stages of enacting the
APA, and was originally issued 'as a guide to the agencies in adjusting their
procedures to the requirements of the Act."' Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,
488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See also
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 n.17 (D.C. Cir.
1974) ("The Attorney General's Manual is entitled to considerable weight because
of the very active role that the Attorney General played in the formulation and
enactment of the APA.").
19. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000).
20. "Agency" is defined under the APA as "each authority of the Government of
the United States." 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2000). Legislative history reveals that
"'[a]uthority' means any officer or board, whether within another agency or not.
[sic] which by law ha.- [sic] authority to take final and binding action with or
without appeal to some superior administrative authority." Attorney General's
Manual, supra note 18, at 9. As the Administrator is exclusively authorized by
Congress to assess civil penalties for violations of the federal environmental
statutes, the Administrator is the "authority of the Government of the United
Spring 2008 Administrative Decisionmakinp,
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have a right to certain notice, 21 and that "[t]he agency shall give all
interested parties opportunity for" making a response to proposed
agency action, and "to the extent that the parties are unable so to
determine a controversy by consent, hearing and decision on notice
and in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title.
22
Congress provides that an ALJ may be appointed to conduct any
hearing that is necessary, and, in conducting any such hearing, the
actions of the ALJ are "[s]ubject to the published rules of the agency
and within its powers."23 This provision has been interpreted to mean
that, on matters of law and policy, an ALJ is subordinate to the
agency in which he or she serves. 24  The Supreme Court has
recognized that Congress intended to make ALJs "semi-independent
States," and, therefore, the agency as identified in the APA. In other statutes a
Board or Commission or Secretary might be the agency. Id.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2000).
22. Id. § 554(c).
23. Id. § 556(c).
24. The Attorney General of the United States has stated that "[t]he phrase 'subject
to the published rules of the agency' is intended to make clear the authority of the
agency to lay down policies and procedural rules which will govern the exercise of
such powers by presiding officers." Attorney General's Manual, supra note 18, at
75. In addition, the federal courts consistently have recognized that, on matters of
law and policy, ALJs are subordinate to the agency in which they serve. See, e.g.,
Croplife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[T]he reality of agency
operations makes it clear that ALJs cannot independently rule on the legality of
third-party human studies, because they may not ignore the Administrator's
unequivocal statement prohibiting the agency from considering such studies.");
Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("It is commonly
recognized that ALJs 'are entirely subject to the agency on matters of law."');
Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 540-541 n.5 (6th Cir. 1986) ("There are, however,
definite limits on the extent to which AL's [sic] may exercise their decisional
independence. Indeed, were it otherwise it might be difficult for the agency to
implement its policies," therefore, ALJs "remain entirely subject to the agency on
matters of law and policy."); D'Amico v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 903, 905-06 (7th
Cir. 1983) (stating that ALJs must comply with an "instruction" issued by the Chief
Administrative Law Judge of the agency announcing "new policy," even though the
instruction "truncated" ALJ discretion, and ALJs believed the instruction injured
social security claimants); Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F.
Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.D.C. 1984) (stating that an ALJ "must 'scrupulously and
conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts,"' but
"[o]n matters of law and policy, however, ALJs are entirely subject to the
agency.").
subordinate hearing officers," and that an ALJ "is a creature of
Congressional enactment., 25
Congress authorized an ALJ only to "initially" decide a case, and
''on appeal from or review of the initial decision the agency has all
the powers which it would have in making the initial decision," with
exceptions not relevant to this discussion. 26  In this regard, the
Supreme Court noted that where Congress places decision-making
authority in a Board, "[t]he responsibility for decision thus placed on
the Board is wholly inconsistent with the notion that it has power to
reverse an examiner's findings only when they are 'clearly erroneous.'
Such a limitation would make so drastic a departure from prior
administrative practice that explicitness would be required.127
The Attorney General of the United States explained that an
initial decision is advisory in nature, and that "[i]n making its
decision, whether following an initial or recommended decision, the
agency is in no way bound by the decision of its subordinate officer;
it retains complete freedom of decision-as though it had heard the
evidence itself. 28
25. Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1953). The
terms "hearing officer" and "trial examiner" and "ALJ" all refer to the same
governmental officer. In 1978 amendments to the APA, Congress provided that
hearing examiners shall be known as administrative law judges. Act of March 27,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183. Notwithstanding the name change, no
amendment was made to the Administrative Procedure Act effecting the authority
of this particular governmental officer. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2000); see also
Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 17.11 (2nd ed. 1980)
(describing the historical development of the position).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
27. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492 (1951). See also FCC v.
Allentown Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955) (rejecting an appellate court's
holding that findings of an ALJ based on witness demeanor are not to be overruled
by an agency's final decision-making authority "without a 'very substantial
preponderance in the testimony as recorded,"' as such a holding was tantamount to
a "clearly erroneous" standard which does not apply to an agency's review of an
AL's initial decisions).
28. Attorney General's Manual supra, note 18, at 83. Federal courts have
interpreted this statutory provision likewise. It has been recognized that Universal
Camera makes clear that "the ultimate responsibility for findings of fact rests with
the National Labor Relations Board by statute, as we believe it rests with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services here, and for the same reasons." Mullen,
800 F.2d at 542. "Under administrative law principles, an agency or board is free
either to adopt or reject an ALJ's findings and conclusions of law." Starrett v.
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Finally, Congress has established criteria which all final agency
action- including final decisions of the Administrator assessing civil
penalties-must meet to conform with the law and be upheld on
judicial review, providing that "[a] sanction may not be imposed or
rule or order issued except on consideration of the whole record or
those parts thereof cited by a party and supported by and in
accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." 29
Congress further provides that, on judicial review, final
decisionmaking of an agency shall be held "unlawful and set aside" if
its findings and conclusions are found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."30
Special Counsel, 792 F.2d 1246, 1252 (4th Cir. 1986). "[A]s the Supreme Court
made clear in Universal Camera, the agency is free to substitute its judgment for
that of the ALJ," and "the AL's determinations are not entitled to any special
deference from the agency except insofar as the AL's findings are based on
witness credibility determinations." Mattes v. United States, 721 F.2d 1125, 1129
(7th Cir. 1983). "[Tlhe fact that the Board reached different factual conclusions that
[sic] the administrative law judge is not as diabolic as respondent suggests," the
issue "is whether the Board's decision is based on substantial evidence." U.S. Soil
Conditioning v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 940, 942 (10th Cir. 1979). "Section 8(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b), clearly authorizes the agency to
'make any findings or conclusions which in its judgment are proper on the record,'
notwithstanding a different determination by the Examiner [ALJ]." Fink v.
Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 417 F.2d 1058, 1059 (2d Cir. 1969).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000).
30. Id. § 706. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that: The
function of the court is to assure that the agency has given reasoned consideration
to all the material facts and issues. This calls for insistence that the agency
articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and identify the
significance of the crucial facts, a course that tends to assure that the agency's
policies effectuate general standards, applied without unreasonable discrimination.
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(citations omitted). The Court emphasized that it has maintained a "rigorous
insistence on the need for conjunction of articulated standards and reflective
findings, in furtherance of even-handed application of law, rather than
impermissible whim, improper influence, or misplaced zeal." Id. at 852. The Court
observed that "in the last analysis it is the agency's function, not the Examiner's, to
make the findings of fact and select the ultimate decision, and where there is
evidence supporting each result it is the agency's choice that governs." Id. at 853.
In addressing the "even handed application of law" in administrative adjudication,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, citing J. Mashaw et al., Social Security
Hearings and Appeals: A Study of the Social Security Administration Hearing
Administrative Decisionmaking
II. THE ADMINISTRATOR'S PROMULGATED RULES
The Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he power of an
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . .
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress."31
The Administrator promulgated the "Consolidated Rules of
Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties,
Issuance of Compliance or Corrective Orders, and the Revocation,
Termination or Suspension of Permits" (the "Administrator's Rules"),
which are codified at 40 C.F.R. part 22.32 These rules were first
promulgated in 1980, 33 and more recently amended.3 4 In the public
notice proposing the amended rules, the Administrator noted that
amendments were necessary to "correct a number of inconsistencies
and ambiguities in the procedures which have become apparent
through experience" with the original rules, which "were
promulgated in 1980 to establish uniform procedural rules for
administrative enforcement proceedings required under various
environmental statutes to be held on the record after opportunity for a
hearing in accordance with section 554 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. et seq."35  The rules "govern all
System 19 (1978), recognized that: Perhaps no characteristic of a procedural
system is so uniformly denounced as a tendency to produce inconsistent results.
When disposition depends more on which judge is assigned to the case than on the
facts or the legal rules, the tendency is to describe the system as lawless, arbitrary,
or the like, even though the case assignment is random. Santise v. Schweiker, 676
F.2d 925, 930 (3rd Cir. 1982).
31. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
32. 40 C.F.R. pt. 22 (1999).
33. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties and the Revocation or Suspension of Permits, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,360
(Apr. 9, 1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 22, 80, 168, 226).
34. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
35. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 63 Fed. Reg. 9464 (Feb. 25, 1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 22,
59).
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administrative adjudicatory proceedings for ...[t]he assessment of
any civil administrative penalty" under various federal environmental
statutes in which Congress has invested the Administrator with
authority to assess civil penalties for violations, those statutes being
specifically identified in the rules.
36
By rule, the notice of proposed penalty order and of opportunity
for hearing, which the Administrator is required by the federal
environmental statutes to provide to alleged violators prior to
assessing any civil penalty against them, is identified by the
Administrator as a "complaint. 3 7  His rules provide that a
"complainant"-meaning "any person authorized to issue a
complaint, 3 8 may issue a complaint which meets the requirements of
40 C.F.R. section 22.14.39 Those requirements include that the
complaint: identify statutory provisions "authorizing the issuance of
the complaint; identify statutory and regulatory provisions which are
"alleged to be violated; include a "concise statement of the factual
basis for each violation alleged[;]" and, at the discretion of the
Administrator's delegated complainant, identify the amount of civil
penalty proposed.40
The complaint also must advise the alleged violator that he or she
has a "right to request a hearing on any material fact alleged in the
complaint, or on the appropriateness of any proposed penalty, '41 and
a copy of the Administrator's Rules must be provided to the alleged
violator along with a copy of the complaint.42
When the alleged violator intends to contest "any material fact
upon which the complaint is based," or if he or she "contends that the
proposed penalty ...is inappropriate," the alleged violator must
respond to the complaint with "a written answer to the complaint." 43
In the answer, a respondent must "clearly and directly admit, deny or
explain each of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,"
36. 40 C.F.R. § 22.1 (2006).
37. Id. § 22.13.
38. Id. § 22.3(a)(2).
39. Id. § 22.14(a).
40. Id. § 22.14(a)(1)-(4).
41. Id. § 22.14(a)(5).
42. Id. § 22.14(b).
43. Id. § 22.15(a).
or, if the respondent is without knowledge and unable to answer, to
so state.4  The respondent also must state in the answer "[t]he
circumstances or arguments which are alleged to constitute the
grounds of any defense; the facts which respondent disputes; the
basis for opposing any proposed relief; and whether a hearing is
requested. '45  The Administrator provides that "failure of the
respondent to admit, deny, or explain any material factual allegation
contained in the complaint constitutes an admission of the
allegation 4 6 and that "[a] hearing upon the issues raised by the
complaint and answer may be held if requested.,
47
The Administrator provides for a pre-hearing process, including
discovery and summary disposition, the latter identified as
"accelerated decision. 4 8 The Administrator also provides specific
rules applicable to the conduct of the hearing49 and requires initial
decisions to be issued by the ALJ presiding in the case. 50
The Administrator provides for review of "initial" decisions by
the Board, either on appeal from a party or on the Board's own
initiative. 51  In those instances where the initial decision is not
appealed to the Board, or otherwise selected by the Board itself for
review, by rule, the initial decision of the ALJ becomes the final
decision of the Administrator "45 days after its service upon the
parties., 5 2  If the initial decision is reviewed by the Board, the
Administrator has provided, without restriction, that the Board "shall
adopt, modify, or set aside the findings of fact and conclusions of law
or discretion contained in the decision or order being reviewed, and
shall set forth in the final order the reasons for its actions.
5 3
In the preamble of his latest promulgation of the rules, the
Administrator stated that [t]he EAB is responsible for assuring
consistency in Agency adjudications by all of the ALJs and RJOs
44. Id. § 22.15(b).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 22.15(d).
47. Id. § 22.15(c).
48. Id. §§ 22.16, 22.19, 22.20.
49. Id. §§ 22.21-22.26.
50. Id. § 22.27.
51. Id. §§ 22.29-22.30.
52. Id. § 22.27(c).
53. Id. § 22.30(f).
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[Regional Judicial Officers]. The appeal process of the
[Administrator's Rules] gives the Agency an opportunity to correct
erroneous decisions before they are appealed to the federal courts.
The EAB assures that final decisions represent with [sic] the position
of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the position of one Region,
one enforcement office, or one Presiding Officer. 
54
III. FINAL DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
This Part examines the final decisionmaking of the Board,
conducted on behalf of the Administrator. It will first review
decisions of the Board relating to the penalty amount for adjudicated
violations. Then it will review the Board's decisions relating to
procedural matters such as summary decisionmaking, discovery and
the admission of evidence.
A. Determination of an Appropriate Penalty Amount
The Administrator provides that, after hearing or on motion for
an accelerated decision, an ALJ must determine an appropriate
amount of penalty in an initial decision. 55 As an ALJ is subordinate
to the Administrator,56 and an initial decision of an ALJ may become
a final decision of the Administrator for which the Administrator is
responsible, 57 the Administrator provides the following guidance to
the ALJs, "The Presiding Officer [an ALJ] shall consider any civil
penalty guidelines issued under the Act [violated]. The Presiding
Officer shall explain in detail in the initial decision how the penalty
to be assessed corresponds to any penalty criteria set forth in the Act.
If the Presiding Officer decides to assess a penalty different in
amount from the penalty proposed by complainant, the Presiding
Officer shall set forth in the initial decision the specific reasons for
the increase or decrease. 5
8
54. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 22).
55. Id. § 22.27(b).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(c).
58. 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b).
1. The Administrator's Civil Penalty Guidelines
Under the federal environmental statutes, Congress authorizes the
Administrator to assess penalty amounts for a violation, or day of
violation, anywhere from $ 1 to as much as $ 10,000 or $ 25,000. 59
In these statutes, Congress provides no guidance as to how the
Administrator is to determine specific amounts of penalty for specific
violations other than to identify narrative criteria that the
Administrator must take into consideration. Given the wide range of
authorized penalty amounts, how the statutory penalty criteria are
interpreted and applied to the evidence of a particular case can have
an enormous influence on whether the penalty amount chosen for a
particular violation will be closer to $1 or to $ 25,000.
In Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission Co., the Supreme Court
recognized a "fundamental principle" that "where Congress has
entrusted an administrative agency with the responsibility of
selecting the means of achieving the statutory policy 'the relation of
remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative
competence."' 60  Consequently, "[t]he fashioning of an appropriate
and reasonable remedy is for the Secretary [of Agriculture], not the
court," and, on judicial review, "[tihe court may decide only whether,
under the pertinent statute and relevant facts, the Secretary made 'an
allowable judgment in his choice of the remedy. '"'6  A corollary to
the recognition of agency discretion is this, "[o]ne of the fundamental
justifications for the administrative process is that an agency
possesses an expertise in a particular subject area that the judiciary,
as it is presently structured, cannot acquire at an acceptable cost. That
justification does not come into play in a particular case unless the
agency has in fact applied its expertise. ', 62
59. See, e.g., CAA § 113(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (2000); CWA § 309(g)(2), 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2) (2000); TSCA § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §2615(a)(1) (2000);
SWDA § 3008(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (2000); EPCRA § 325, 42 U.S.C. §
11045 (2000).
60. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185 (1973).
61. Id. at 188-89.
62. Brock v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 801 F.2d 926, 932 (7th Cir. 1986).
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Just as Congress entrusted the Secretary of Agriculture with
selecting the means of achieving the statutory policy of the Packers
and Stockyards Act 63 at issue in Butz, Congress entrusted the
Administrator with selecting the means of achieving the statutory
policy of the federal environmental laws, 64 utilizing the expertise
made available to him in his agency. Consequently, the fashioning of
an appropriate remedy, such as determining penalty amounts for
violations of a federal environmental statute, is a matter of the
Administrator's discretion.65
The Administrator, pursuant to his authority as Chief Executive
Officer, organized the agency. One of the "[n]ine operational offices,
each headed by an Assistant Administrator responsible for carrying
out EPA's major environmental and administrative programs," 66 is
the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring.67 "Under the
supervision of' the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and
Compliance Monitoring, this office serves as the principal adviser to
the Administrator in matters concerning enforcement and
compliance; and provides the principal direction and review of civil
enforcement activities for air, water, waste, pesticides, toxics, and
radiation. The Assistant Administrator [for Enforcement and
Compliance Monitoring] reviews the efforts of each Assistant and
Regional Administrator to assure that EPA develops and conducts a
strong and consistent enforcement and compliance monitoring
program. The Office manages the national criminal enforcement
program; ensures coordination of media office administrative
compliance programs, and civil and criminal enforcement activities;
and provides technical expertise for enforcement activities. 68
63. Glover Livestock Comm'n, 411 U.S. at 188-89.
64. See supra Part I.B. 1 (describing Congressional authority vested in the
Administrator).
65. See Panhandle Coop. Ass'n v. EPA, 771 F.2d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The
assessment of a penalty is particularly delegated to the administrative agency. Its
choice of sanction is not to be overturned unless 'it is unwarranted in law' or
'without justification in fact."'); see also Robinson v. United States, 718 F.2d 336,
339 (10th Cir. 1983) ("once the agency determines that a violation has been
committed, the sanctions to be imposed are a matter of agency policy and
discretion.").
66. 40 C.F.R. § 1.21 (2006).
67. Id. § 1.35.
68. Id.
This delegation of authority is long-standing. 69 On February 16,
1984, the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance
Monitoring ("Assistant Administrator"), on behalf of the
Administrator, issued general policy documents regarding the
determination of appropriate civil penalty amounts in the
Administrator's civil penalty assessment process. 70 These documents
were published in an effort to assure that the process resulted in
assessed penalties meeting designated goals of "deterrence, fair and
equitable treatment of the regulated community, and swift resolution
of environmental problems." 71 The Assistant Administrator directed
that each division of the Agency issue program-specific penalty
policies, based upon Agency-wide framework principals being
announced that day. 72  Policy GM-21 directs that "[i]n order to
achieve the above Agency policy goals, all administratively imposed
penalties and settlements of civil penalty actions should, where
possible, be consistent with the guidance contained in the Framework
document. Deviations from the Framework's methodology, where
merited, are authorized as long as the reasons for the deviations are
documented. 01
69. In announcing an update, the Administrator delegated on June 30, 1978 to his
Assistant Administrator for Enforcement the task of "serv[ing] as the principal
adviser to the Administrator in matters pertaining to the enforcement of standards
for environmental quality, and [being] responsible for the conduct of enforcement
activities on an agencywide [sic] basis." 43 Fed. Reg. 28,479, 28482 (June 30,
1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1.31). This title was later expanded to Assistant
Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring. See 49 Fed. Reg.
26,727, 26,730 (June 29, 1984). In addition to being the "principal adviser to the
Administrator in matters concerning enforcement and compliance," this Assistant
Administrator was also to "review[] the efforts of each Assistant and Regional
Administrator to assure that EPA develops and conducts a strong and consistent
enforcement and compliance monitoring program." Id.
70. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Policy on Civil Penalties: EPA Gen. Enforcement
Policy #GM-21 (1984) [hereinafter Policy GM-21]; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, A
Framework for Statute- Specific Approaches to Penalty Assessments:
Implementing EPA's Policy on Civil Penalties, EPA Gen. Enforcement Policy
#GM-22 (1984) [hereinafter Policy GM-22].
71. Policy GM-21, supra note 70, at 1; Policy GM-22, supra note 70, at 1
72. Policy GM-21, supra note 70, at 1; Policy GM-22, supra note 70, at 1.
73. Policy GM-21, supra note 70, at 1.
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The "consistent application of a penalty policy" was found
important "because otherwise the resulting penalties might be seen as
being arbitrarily assessed. Thus violators would be more inclined to
litigate over those penalties. This would consume Agency resources
and make swift resolution of environmental problems less likely."
7 4
The Administrator's general policy and framework document also
recognized that "[t]reating similar situations in a similar fashion is
central to the credibility of EPA's enforcement effort and to the
success of achieving the goal of equitable treatment."
75
While each of the Administrator's statute-specific policies address
the penalty criteria of the particular statute involved, the policies
generally provide for a two step process in which evidence is
evaluated in consideration of the statutory penalty criteria. The first
step is the determination of a preliminary deterrence amount, which
involves an "economic benefit" component and a "gravity of harm"
76component. The "economic benefit" component consists of
determining the dollar amount by which the violator was enriched as
a consequence of his violating conduct, based upon the evidence in
the case. 77 A dollar amount representing the gravity of the violation
is then added, which incorporates a consideration of such things as
the amount and toxicity of the pollutant involved; the actual harm, or
potential for harm, presented by the violating conduct; the sensitivity
of the ambient environment; the duration of the violation; and the
threat to the regulatory scheme presented by the violating conduct.78
To assist in the gravity determination, a matrix is often provided,
with dollar amounts on the matrix ranging from low to high,
representing various degrees of harm as disclosed by the evidence in
the case. Once the preliminary deterrence amount is determined, that
amount will be raised or lowered, based upon a consideration of the
evidence in the case relating to such statutory criteria as the violator's
culpability; ability to pay a particular penalty amount; history of prior
74. Id. at 4.
75. Policy GM-22, supra note 70, at 27.
76. Id. at2.
77. Id. at 6-12.
78. Id. at 13-15.
violations; and other factors as justice may require specific to the
case.
79
2. An Analysis of the Administrator's Final Penalty
Determinations as Issued by the Board, in Consideration of the
Language of the Federal Environmental Statutes, the APA, and the
Administrator's Rules
Although the Board has acknowledged that the Administrator's
regulations "grant the Board de novo review of a penalty
determination" 80  in an ALJ's initial decision, without any
consideration of the language of Congress in the federal
environmental statutes and in sections 556(c), 557(b) and 706 of the
APA, "the Board has many times stated that it will generally not
substitute its judgment for that of an ALJ absent a showing that the
ALJ committed clear error or an abuse of discretion in assessing a
penalty."t8t
79. Id. at 16-24.
80. In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. 88, 117 (2003).
81. In re CDT Landfill Corporation, 11 E.A.D. at 117. A word must be said about
terminology. An ALJ is not authorized by Congress in any federal environmental
statute to "assess" a civil penalty; only the Administrator is invested with that
authority. See supra Part I.B.1. The Supreme Court has noted that "[o]ur
precedents make clear that the starting point for our analysis is the statutory text.
And where, as here, the words of the statute are unambiguous, the 'judicial inquiry
is complete."' Desert Palace, Inc., v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (citations
omitted). Moreover, "[a] fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). As the
Administrator is one specifically designated Chief Executive Officer of a federal
agency, the words "the Administrator" appearing in the several federal
environmental statutes cannot be interpreted, consistent with sound principles of
statutory interpretation, to include each of several ALJs who are "creature[s] of
congressional enactment" and "semi-independent subordinate hearing officers."
Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1953).
Moreover, in the relevant "Congressional enactment," Section 557(b) of the APA,
Congress authorizes an ALJ to do no more than "initially" decide a matter. And, in
conformance with that section, the Administrator has invested ALJs with authority
only to initially decide a matter. 40 C.F.R. § 22.17 (2006). Consequently, the
notion that an ALJ "assesses" or is "assessing" a penalty is inaccurate.
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The Board has recognized an AL's independence from the
Administrator's policies when determining penalty amounts, stating
that an AL's obligation under 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) to consider a
particular penalty policy adopted by the Administrator carries with it
no obligation to adhere to the penalty policy in a particular instance.
Nor does it suggest that a presiding officer errs in the slightest respect
if he or she decides not to deviate from the penalty policy. The fact
that the presiding officer has a choice of either following or deviating
from the [p]enalty [p]olicy operates to preserve not restrict the
presiding officer's independence. 82
Five years later, the Board stated "as we have made clear in many
prior decisions, once a presiding officer considers the relevant
penalty policy, he or she may adopt the penalty computed in
accordance with that policy or deviate therefrom, so long as the
penalty assessed reflects the criteria in the applicable statute. 83
The "Board has repeatedly stated that a Presiding Officer, having
considered any applicable civil penalty guidelines issued by the
Agency, is nonetheless free not to apply them to the case at hand,, 84
and observed that an ALJ, in determining a penalty amount in an
initial decision, could simply have considered the [p]enalty [p]olicy's
analytical framework and concluded that, in this particular case,
application of the TSCA § 16 criteria in the manner suggested by the
[p]enalty [p]olicy did not yield an 'appropriate' penalty. The ALJ
could likewise have rejected an 'appropriate' penalty generated in
accordance with the Penalty Policy, in favor of another 'appropriate'
penalty better suited to the circumstances of this particular case. 85
Moreover, the Board has stated "it also should be clear that
subsumed within the AL's authority to assess a penalty different than
one calculated under Agency guidance is the notion that Agency
guidance does not limit the AL's authority to assess a penalty that is
otherwise in accordance with the statutory factors., 86
82. In re DIC Americas, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 184, 190-91 (1995) (citation omitted).
83. In re Rogers Corp., 9 E.A.D. 534, 569 (2000).
84. In re Employers Ins. of Wausau & Group Eight Tech., Inc., 6 E.A.D. 735, 758
(1997).
85. Id. at 759.
86. In re U.S. Army, Fort Wainwright Cent. Heating & Power Plant, 11 E.A.D.
126, 172 (2003).
From its decisionmaking, it would appear that the Board has
failed to heed the admonishment of Justice Frankfurter and, indeed,
has "read the laws of Congress through the distorting lenses of
inapplicable legal doctrine." 87 The Board does not analyze its role,
and that of an ALJ, in consideration of the language of the laws of
Congress which govern the Administrator's penalty assessment
process, those laws being the federal environmental statutes and the
APA.88 Instead, the Board has adopted appellate review principles of
the judicial process, ruling as if the ALJ was an independent trial
judge assessing penalty amounts, and, in its review of an AL's
decision, the Board, like an appellate court, is to give deference to the
AL's penalty assessment. As we shall see, this is a problem. In
deferring decisionmaking to each of several ALJs, rather than acting
as the delegated authority responsible for the content of the
Administrator's final decisions, the Board has adopted a posture on
review which is not in accordance with law. Moreover, as a
consequence of deferring decisionmaking to each of several ALJs,
the Board has issued final decisions on behalf of the Administrator
that are arbitrary and capricious.
a. Review Standards of the Board are not in Accordance with
Law
Given the law and the Administrator's Rules and delegation, the
Board itself is responsible for assessing civil penalties and
determining the amount of those penalties in final decisions of the
Administrator, not each of the several ALJs. The Supreme Court has
reviewed rules promulgated by the Attorney General under the
Immigration Act of 1917, in which the Attorney General delegated
his final decision- making authority to a Board of Immigration
Appeals. The Court held that "the Board was required, as it still is, to
exercise its own judgment when considering appeals," and that, "if
the word 'discretion' means anything in a statutory or administrative
grant of power, it means that the recipient must exercise his authority
according to his own understanding and conscience." 89
87. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 144 (1940).
88. See supra Part I.B.
89. U. S. ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954). The
procedure under review here "called for decisions at three separate administrative
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As we have seen, the Administrator has created a unified Board,
delegating to that Board his authority to issue final decisions
assessing civil penalties.9" Recognizing his obligations under the
federal environmental statutes and the APA, 91 the Administrator
publicly announced that the Board "is responsible for assuring
consistency in Agency adjudications by all of the ALJs and RJOs,"
and that it is "to correct erroneous decisions before they are appealed
to the federal courts" and assure "that final decisions represent with
[sic] the position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the
position of one Region, one enforcement office, or one Presiding
Officer." 92  Toward that end, by rule, the Administrator provides,
without restriction, that the Board "shall adopt, modify, or set aside
the findings of fact and conclusions of law or discretion contained in
the [initial] decision or order being reviewed, and shall set forth in
the final order the reasons for its actions."93 Like the rules of the
Attorney General reviewed in Accardi, the clear import of the
language of the Administrator in his rules, and their preamble, is that
the Board is required "to exercise its own judgment when considering
appeals,"94 and not to defer to the judgment of whichever one of
several ALJs authored the initial decision.
95
levels below the Attorney General-hearing officer, Commissioner, and the Board of
Immigration Appeals." Id. at 266. Regarding the Board, the regulations provided
that "[i]n considering and determining . . . appeals, the Board of Immigration
Appeals shall exercise such discretion and power conferred upon the Attorney
General by law as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case." Id.
The decision of the Board was final except in certain delineated circumstances set
out in the rules. Id.
90. Changes to Regulations to Reflect the Role of the New Environmental Appeals
Board in Agency Adjudications, 57 Fed. Reg. 5320 (Feb. 13, 1992) (codified at 40
C.F.R. §§ 1, 3, 17, 22, 27, 57, 60, 66, 85, 86, 114, 123, 124, 164, 209, 222, 223,
233,403).
91. See supra Part I.B.
92. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 22).
93. 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(f) (2006) (emphasis added).
94. Accardi, 347 U.S. at 266-67.
95. In a 1987 final decision, the Administrator's CJO recognized that "[t]he
Administrator has the responsibility for making final agency decisions," citing, in
part, to Professor Kenneth C. Davis's description of the case law on the relationship
Moreover, an ALJ is not "the agency."96 Federal courts interpret
an AL's decisionmaking as subject to the law and policy of the
agency, i.e., the Administrator.97 As, by law, an ALJ in making an
initial decision is subordinate to the Administrator on matters of law
and policy, and the law recognizes that a penalty amount
determination is an exercise of agency discretion involving matters of
law and policy,98 it would appear that the law is contrary to the
Board's position that each ALJ independently determines penalty
amounts, and its inclination to defer to the discretion of each of
several ALJs in determining appropriate penalty amounts for the
Administrator to assess for violations of the federal environmental
statutes.
In this regard, two characteristics of a penalty determination also
must be noted. First, "[t]he assessment [of a penalty] is not a factual
finding but the exercise of a discretionary grant of power."99 The
Administrator, through his CJO, has explained that although the
quantity of a particular chemical may be a factual issue bearing on
the appropriateness of a penalty, as may be the "ability of the
company to continue doing business," whether the policy should
impose a separate penalty for each chemical not reported, or whether
an appropriate penalty dollar amount was selected for each box of the
policy matrix "is a legal or policy issue."' 00 Consequently, as a
between the ALJ and the agency: The final distillation (of present case law) is that
the primary factfinder is the agency, not the ALJ; that the agency retains 'the power
of ruling on facts .... [i]n the first instance'; that the agency still has 'all the powers
which it would have in making the initial, [sic] decision', that the ALJ is a
subordinate whose findings do not have the weight of the findings of a district
judge; that the relation between the AU and agency is not the same as or even
closely similar to the relation between agency and reviewing court; and that the
AL's findings are nevertheless to be taken into account by the reviewing court and
given special weight when they depend upon demeanor of witnesses. In re Martin
Elecs., Inc., 2 E.A.D. 381, 394-95 (1987) (citing 3 Kenneth Culp Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 17:16 (2d ed. 1980)).
96. See supra note 20 (discussing the definition of "Agency").
97. See supra note 24 (discussing the interpretation of the Administrative
Procedure Act).
98. See supra note 65 and Part III(A)(2).
99. Panhandle Coop. Ass'n v. EPA, 771 F.2d. 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1985).
100. In re Chautauqua Hardware Corporation, 3 E.A.D. 616, 623 (1991).
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penalty amount determination is not an issue of fact, it is not a
determination to be established by witness testimony, and deference
to an AL's penalty amount determination cannot be warranted on
grounds that he alone had an opportunity to observe witness
demeanor. 101
Second, although one of the fundamental justifications for
judicial deference to the administrative process is that an agency
"possesses an expertise in a particular subject area" that judges do not
have, "[t]hat justification does not come into play in a particular case
unless the agency has in fact applied its expertise. ' 102 The Assistant
Administrator, to whom the Administrator has directly delegated his
policy-making authority, can draw upon the historical experience and
technical expertise of the Administrator's entire agency in
formulating and issuing the Administrator's policy. In contrast, an
ALJ, by law, is restricted in making his initial decision to the
administrative record in the case before him.'0 3 One ALJ cannot
match the agency's collective training, historical experience, and
expertise in evaluating environmental risks and environmental
harm.'0 4  Consequently, an AL's pronouncements and judgments
regarding policy and discretion on such matters are suspect when at
odds with the Administrator's own issued policy statements, and to
the extent that a penalty determination is informed by an AL's
personal policy choices and not those of the Administrator, a
reviewing court cannot find that "the agency has in fact applied its
expertise."' 105
It must be emphasized that the Administrator's penalty policies
are not separate and apart from the penalty criteria of the subject
statute; the policies are interpretations of the statutory penalty
101. See River Forest Pharmacy, Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 501 F.2d 1202,
1206 (7th Cir. 1974) (witness credibility and demeanor "are irrelevant to an
assessment of the seriousness of petitioner's violations and of the sanction most
appropriate for the promotion of agency policy regarding them.").
102. Brock v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 801 F.2d. 926, 932 (7th Cir. 1986).
103. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)-(e).
104. See Accelerated Decision, In re U.S. Army, Fort Wainwright Cent. Heating &
Power Plant, U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA-10-99-0121, 7, n.5 (Apr. 30,
2002) ("none of EPA's current ALJs worked for the Agency or any state
environmental entity prior to their judicial appointment").
105. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 801 F.2d. at 932.
criteria, and they incorporate penalty calculation methodologies
based upon those interpretations. The interpretations and
methodologies in these policies are those of the Administrator, the
Chief Executive Officer of EPA in whom Congress has specifically
and exclusively invested authority to assess, and to determine the
amount of, civil penalties for violations of the federal environmental
statutes.10 6 These interpretations and methodologies are formulated
and issued by the senior officers to whom the Administrator has
specifically delegated his policy-making authority in enforcement
matters. 1
0 7
Moreover, these penalty policies do not require that a specific
penalty amount be determined appropriate for any particular violation
of any particular violator. Before any penalty amount can be
determined appropriate, there must be an analysis of the evidence in
the record relating to a specific violation and a specific violator,
applying the statutory criteria as interpreted in the various premises
of the policy. The policies explicitly allow for "[d]eviations from the
[policy's framework], where merited," so long as "the reasons for the
deviations are documented. ' 10 8 It is one thing, however, for a penalty
amount determination in a final decision to deviate from a premise in
the Administrator's penalty policy framework regarding a particular
penalty criteria-for instance, where it does not appear that the
evidence in a particular case has been contemplated by the policy-
while applying the remainder of the policy. It is something far
different when the Board adopts an initial decision of an ALJ as a
final decision of the Administrator, holding that the ALJ has the
discretion to reject "an 'appropriate' penalty generated in accordance
with the [p]enalty [p]olicy" if the ALJ personally finds a different
amount of penalty than that yielded by the Administrator's policy
106. See supra notes 12-16 (discussing the statutory delegation of Congressional
authority to the Administrator under various statutes).
107. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing Administrator's
delegation of authority to the Board); see also In re Bell & Howell Co., 1 E.A.D.
811, 817 n.6 (1983) ("the penalty guidelines constitute an interpretation of the
statutory factors set forth in TSCA § 16(a)(2)" and "the Administrator ...has
specifically directed the presiding officer in § 22.27(b) of the procedural rules to
give that interpretation consideration.").
108. Policy GM-21, supra note 70, at 1.
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"better suited to the circumstances of the particular case."' 9 It is
something far different when, as we shall see, the Board adopts in a
final decision of the Administrator an independent penalty
determination of an ALJ, finding that the ALJ was within his
discretion in rejecting the Administrator's policy as arbitrary and
unauthorized by statute. It is also far different when the Board
adopts, in a final decision of the Administrator, a penalty
determination of an ALJ, even though the ALJ in making the
determination simply ignored the Administrator's policy without
comment. 110
109. In re Employers Ins. of Wausau & Group Eight Tech., Inc., 6 E.A.D. 735, 759
(1997). The ruling of the Board in In re Employers Insurance of Wausau and Group
Eight Technology, Inc. warrants closer scrutiny, as it is emblematic of the
confusion which has plagued the Administrator's penalty assessment process. If "an
'appropriate' penalty generated in accordance with the [p]enalty [p]olicy" is before
the ALJ, as here contemplated by the Board, by what authority does the Board find
that the ALJ has the discretion to reject that penalty amount for a penalty amount
that the ALJ personally finds "better suited to the circumstances of the particular
case[?]" Id. Given that the penalty policy from which the rejected penalty amount
was generated was the Administrator's policy, is such a holding not at odds with the
statute itself, in this case TSCA, in which Congress makes clear that it is the
Administrator, and not anyone else, who is to determine the penalty amount? In
recognizing that a presiding ALJ can pick a penalty amount which he personally
finds "better suited to the circumstances of the particular case" than one generated
by use of the Administrator's policy, is the Board's holding not at odds with section
557(b) of the APA, in which Congress invests ALJs with authority only to issue
initial decisions, making the agency responsible for the contents of final decisions?
110. The Administrator's penalty policies, and his intended use of the policies,
stand in marked contrast to the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC")
penalty guidelines found to be promulgated unlawfully. See U.S. Telephone Ass'n
v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In 1991, the FCC decided to "abandon its
traditional case-by-case approach to implementing section 503(b)" of the Federal
Communications Act ("FCA"), and issued specific standards for assessing fines. Id.
at 1233. The Court found that penalty amounts assessed by the FCC in all but eight
of over 300 cases were automatically determined under the standards, based upon
nothing more than the name of the violation found to have been committed and
which category the violator fell within. Id. at 1233-34. The Court struck down the
standards, finding that, although not promulgated as a rule, the FCC was applying
the standards as a rule, disallowing anyone charged with a violation to challenge
the penalty amount assessed. Id. at 1235-36. Like the FCC guidelines, the
Administrator's penalty policies have not been made subject to rulemaking. No
penalty policy of the Administrator, however, requires that any particular amount
of penalty be assessed against any particular violator for any particular violation;
nor, for that matter, does any such policy require that anyone do anything. Under
A careful reading of 40 C.F.R. section 22.27(b) reveals that the
Administrator allows an ALJ, in making an initial decision,
discretion to determine appropriate "a penalty different in amount
from the penalty proposed by complainant," provided the ALJ "shall
set forth in the initial decision the specific reasons for the increase or
decrease."11' In the very same rule, however, the Administrator
provides that an ALJ "shall" consider the applicable penalty policy of
the Administrator, and shall is a word that generally indicates a
requirement." 12
One need not go to a dictionary to comprehend the meaning of
the word "consider." In section 113(e)(1) of the CAA, for instance,
Congress provides that "[i]n determining the amount of any penalty,"
the Administrator "shall take into consideration" the statutory criteria
that it has identified. 1 3 One cannot seriously argue that by "take into
consideration" Congress intended to leave the Administrator free to
these policies, each penalty determination must incorporate an evaluation of the
evidence of record in consideration of each statutory penalty criteria, as interpreted
by the Administrator in his policies and penalty calculation methodologies, and
each violator can challenge the appropriateness of the particular penalty amount
proposed by the Administrator's delegated complainant. See Framework GM-22, 6-
16. These policies do not share the infirmities of the FCC standards. Although there
is a basic presumption that a penalty amount calculated by applying all particular
propositions of an applicable penalty policy's methodology will result in
appropriate, fair and consistent penalty amounts being assessed, the policies
themselves permit deviation from particular propositions of their methodology, "as
long as reasons for the deviations are documented." Policy GM-21, supra note 70,
at 1. Courts have recognized that "[a]n agency pronouncement is not deemed a
binding regulation merely because it may have 'some substantive impact,' as long
as it 'leave[s] the administrator free to exercise his informed discretion,"' and that
"[p]resumptions, so long as rebuttable, leave such freedom." Panhandle Producers
& Royalty Owners Ass'n v. Econ. Regulatory Admin., 822 F.2d 1105, 1110 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). "This court and others have consistently stated that an agency may
announce presumptions through policy statements rather than notice-and- comment
rulemaking." Id. (citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506
F.2d 33, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
111. 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) (2006).
112. Ass'n of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter v. Fed. Labor Relations
Auth., 22 F.3d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("The word 'shall' generally indicates a
command that admits of no discretion on the part of the person instructed to carry
out the directive.").
113. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2000).
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reject any or all of the statutory penalty criteria if he thought a
resulting penalty amount was too low or excessive, and apply other
criteria more to his personal liking. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, in remanding a CWA penalty case back to the District Court
because the judge failed to consider each and every one of the
statutory criteria of section 309(d) of the CWA, 114 instructed the
judge that, in determining the amount of penalty he would assess, the
judge must "clearly indicat[e] the weight [he] gives to each of the
factors in the statute and the factual findings that support [his]
conclusions."'" 5 There is no discernible reason for interpreting the
word "consider" as incorporating "reject," whether the word is used
by Congress in instructing the Administrator and district court
judges, or by the Administrator in instructing the subordinate ALJs
on matters of law and policy.116
Therefore, the Administrator's rule is consistent with the
subordination of ALJs to the Administrator on matters of law and
policy. 1 7  It is consistent with the intent of Congress that the
Administrator be responsible for the contents of his final decisions, 118
and that his final decisions not be arbitrary and capricious." 9 It is
also consistent with the intent of Congress in the federal
environmental statutes that the Administrator determines the amount
of penalty for violations and that, in determining the amount of
penalty, the Administrator takes into account the penalty criteria
identified in the statute. 120
Ultimately, whether the final penalty amount determination is
made by an ALJ in an initial decision, which becomes a final
decision by rule or by adoption by the Board, or is made by the
114.33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2000).
115. Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1142 (11 th
Cir. 1990).
116. See Getty v. Fed. Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 805 F.2d 1050, 1055 (D.C. Cir.
1986) ("Stating that a factor was considered, however, is not a substitute for
considering it. We must make a 'searching and careful' inquiry to determine if [the
agency] actually did consider it." (emphasis in original)).
117. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 22.27 (2006).
118. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
119. See id. § 706.
120. See supra notes 12-16 (describing delegation of authority for penalties to the
Administrator).
Board itself, the Administrator is responsible for the decision. 121
Consequently, the Administrator is obligated by law to establish
effective rules and policy which will govern decision makers who, on
his behalf, will determine whether a $1 penalty or a $ 25,000 penalty
is appropriate for a particular violation of a federal environmental
statute. He clearly stated his intention that the Board, as his final
decision maker, "assure[] that final decisions represent with [sic] the
position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the position of...
one Presiding Officer."'122 The position of the Agency as a whole is
the position taken in the Administrator's Rules and policy, and in the
Administrator's published decisions issued by his CJO and the Board.
The Administrator's APA responsibility for the content of his
final decisions, and for his decisions not being arbitrary and
capricious, cannot be met when the Board interprets his rules to
recognize each individual ALJ as possessing broad discretion to
determine penalty amounts, holding that an ALJ "has a choice of
either following or deviating from" the Administrator's adopted
policy, which choice "operates to preserve not restrict the presiding
officer's independence."' 123 The Administrator cannot fulfill his APA
responsibility when the Board holds that it is "clear that subsumed
within the AL's authority to assess a penalty different than one
calculated under Agency guidance is the notion that Agency
guidance does not limit the AL's authority to assess a penalty that is
otherwise in accordance with the statutory factors."'124
It should be noted that, on occasion, the Board has cited the APA
in an attempt to explain its recognition of discretion to be given an
AL's penalty assessment. The Board has stated that, "by reviewing
the Region's [Administrator's delegated complainant's, or
enforcement staffs] analysis of the statutory factors and
121. Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 587 F.2d 428, 431-32 (9th
Cir. 1978) (where an agency head "has broad powers to delegate his authority," the
delegation of authority "did not . . . relieve him of the responsibility for action
taken pursuant to the delegation."). ,
122. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 22).
123. In re DIC Americas, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 184, 191 (1995).
124. In re U.S. Army Fort Wainwright Cent. Heating & Power Plant, 11 E.A.D.
126, 172 (2003).
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independently determining that the analysis is a reasonable one and
that the recommended penalty is supported by analysis, the Presiding
Officer acts to ensure that the Agency's penalty assessment satisfies
the Administrative Procedure Act's 'abuse of discretion' standard, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2), i.e., that the assessment is neither 'unwarranted in
law' nor 'without justification in fact." 125
Although ALJs do have a responsibility to assure that penalty
determinations in any initial decision are not without justification in
fact, unwarranted in law, or an abuse of discretion, and,
consequently, that the determination is in accordance with section
706 of the APA, 12 6 a review of the applicable law clearly reveals that
an ALJ does not "act to ensure that the Agency's penalty assessment
satisfies the [APA's review criteria]," as the Board has stated. 127
ALJs also have attempted to cite the APA for the purpose of
asserting decisional independence. Without reference to any
particular statutory language, the Chief AU of EPA has described
the AU role by noting that ALJs "have decisional independence
pursuant to Section 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 557, which ensures the fair and impartial resolution of
adjudicatory proceedings,"' 28 and, without recognizing section 556(c)
of the APA, 129 or making any distinction between factual issues and
125. In re Employers Ins. of Wausau & Group Eight Tech., Inc., 6 E.A.D. 735, 757
(1997). Another word on terminology: federal appellate courts have recognized
that, at any hearing to assess noncompliance penalties under a federal
environmental statute, it is the Administrator who is the "'proponent' of the agency
compliance order." Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355,
367 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Administrator has delegated that authority to certain
persons, identified in his procedural rules as complainants, 40 C.F.R. § 22.3 (2006),
not to the various Regions, which are the ten offices he has established at various
locations across the nation for purposes of administering the agency. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1.1 to 1.7 (2000). Consequently, throughout this article, including passages in
cited decisions, the terms "the Administrator's delegated complainant" or "the
Administrator's enforcement staff' or "complainant" are used to designate the
proponent of a proposed penalty order rather than "the Region."
126. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
127. In re Employers Ins. of Wausau & Group Eight Tech., Inc., 6 E.A.D. at 757.
See supra, Part I(B)(l).
128. Accelerated Decision, In re U.S. Army, Fort Wainwright Cent. Heating &
Power Plant, U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA-10-99-0121, 7 (Apr. 30, 2002).
129. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000) (stating that the decisionmaking of ALJs is "subject
to the published rules of the agency").
issues of law and policy, stated that ALJs "are institutionally
insulated from any bias in favor of EPA's positions in litigation."
'1 30
Moreover, without any analysis of the language of section 113(d) of
the CAA, the operative statute in the case, the Chief ALJ stated that
the "EPA litigation team proposes the amount of penalty ... and [t]he
ALJ, on the other hand, independently determines the amount of a
penalty. '"' 131
Again, all federal environmental statutes invest exclusive
authority to assess penalties in the Administrator, not ALJs, and
under section 557(b) of the APA,132 an ALJ has authority only to
issue initial decisions on behalf of an agency. This same section
authorizes only an agency-again, for our purposes, that being the
Administrator 133 -to issue final decisions, thereby making the
Administrator, not an ALJ, responsible for the content of all final
decisions. 134 Consequently, section 706 of the APA makes the
agency, i.e., the Administrator, not various individual ALJs,
responsible for assuring that final decisions are not arbitrary or
capricious or an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law.
130. Accelerated Decision, In re U.S. Army, Fort Wainwright Cent. Heating &
Power Plant, U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA-10-99-0121, 7 (Apr. 30, 2002).
131. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis in original). The Chief ALJ makes no mention of a
number of points of law relevant to a description of the role of an ALJ in the
Administrator's penalty assessment process: (1) that section 113(d) of the CAA, 5
U.S.C. § 7413(d), is absolutely silent as to any role played by an ALJ in the
Administrator's assessment of civil penalties; (2) that in that same section of the
CAA, Congress requires that, prior to assessing any penalty, the Administrator
provide to the alleged violator notice of his "proposal to issue such order," and that
the complaint prepared by the EPA litigation team is the notice of the proposed
penalty order of the same Administrator who is responsible for the contents of the
final order, 5 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2); (3) that in section 557(b) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §
557(b), Congress authorizes ALJs only to initially decide any matter, making the
agency responsible for the contents of any final decision and investing the agency
with plenary authority to set aside any finding or conclusion of an ALJ in his or her
initial decision; and (4) that in conformance with section 557(b) of the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 557(b), by rule, 40 C.F.R. § 22.27, the Administrator authorizes an ALJ
only to issue initial decisions, and invests the Board with authority to make his
final decisions, which includes plenary authority to set aside any finding or
conclusion made by an ALJ in his or her initial decision, and an obligation to
assure that his final decisions are consistent.
132. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
133. See supra note 20.
134. See supra note 28.
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Having delegated his final decision-making authority to the Board,
and having specifically declared that the Board "is responsible for
assuring consistency in Agency adjudications" and "assur[ing] that
final decisions represent with [sic] the position of the Agency as a
whole, rather than just the position of. .. one Presiding Officer,"'1 35
the Administrator has made the Board itself responsible for assuring
that all final decisions of the Administrator meet judicial review
criteria identified in section 706 of the APA, not each of the several
ALJs assigned to the Administrator.'36
The Board also has attempted to support its "deference" to AU
"discretion" in the determination of an appropriate penalty amount by
explaining its position in consideration of the subject federal
environmental statute. It did this in its decision in In Re Johnson
Pacific, Inc.137 The record reviewed in the matter revealed that the
Administrator's enforcement staff filed an administrative complaint
proposing a $ 9,600 penalty-an amount determined by an application
of the Administrator's penalty policy-for Respondent's violations of
FIFRA. The AU found all violations proven, but determined a
penalty of $ 4,080 was appropriate. 138  The Administrator's
enforcement staff appealed to the Board. In the Administrator's final
decision, the Board stated that, "[a]lthough the Board has discretion
to increase or decrease the amount of a civil penalty assessed by a
presiding officer, we customarily defer to the Presiding Officer if the
Presiding Officer has provided a reasonable explanation for the
assessment and if the penalty amount is within the range prescribed
by any applicable guidelines." 139
The Board went on to state that "no increase in the Presiding
Officer's penalty assessment is warranted," and, with regard to certain
objections raised by enforcement staff to the AL's selected penalty
amount, "we are not persuaded that they are sufficiently well founded
135. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 22).
136. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 22).
137. In re Johnson Pacific, Inc., 5 E.A.D. 696 (1995).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 702.
for us to exercise our discretion to interfere with the latitude which
FIFRA affords a Presiding Officer when deliberating over the
'appropriateness' of the penalty. See FIFRA § 12(a)(4)." 140
A review, however, of section 14(a)(4) of FIFRA,-there is no
section 12(a)(4) of FIFRA, cited by the Board-reveals that Congress
does not mention Presiding Officers or ALJs at all, much less grant
ALJs latitude when deliberating over the appropriateness of any
penalty amount or the authority to assess civil penalties.' 4 ' To the
contrary, the language of Congress is clear: any violator of FIFRA
"may be assessed a civil penalty by the Administrator of not more
than $ 5,000 for each offense," and "[i]n determining the amount of
the penalty the Administrator shall consider the appropriateness of
such penalty to the size of the business of the person charged, the
effect on the person's ability to continue in business, and the gravity
of the violation." 142
b. Arbitrary and Capricious Penalty Determinations of the Board
The fact that reasonable men and women may be of a different
mind regarding appropriate sanctions for violations of the law is well
recognized. Indeed, the Board itself has observed that "reasonable
people may disagree over the amount of penalty in a particular
case."' 43 Given that observation of human nature, it should not be
surprising that various Board members, ALJs, and delegated
complainants of the Administrator, as individuals, may have differing
ideas as to whether a $ 5,000 or $ 20,000 penalty is warranted for a
particular violation of a federal environmental statute. It is entirely
possible that a reasonably plausible explanation could be given to
support either penalty amount, depending upon the weight and
interpretation given to the various narrative statutory penalty criteria,
and the policy adopted by the decision maker.
Regardless of the personal views of any Board member, ALJ, or
delegated complainant of the Administrator regarding an appropriate
penalty amount for a violation of a federal environmental statute,
140. Id.
141. See 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(4) (2000).
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. In re Johnson Pacific, Inc., 5 E.A.D. at 703.
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Congress makes clear in those statutes that it is the Administrator
who is responsible for assessing and determining the amount of civil
penalties for their violation. 1" Moreover, Congress makes the
agency, i.e., the Administrator, responsible for the content of his final
decisions. 14 5
Unfortunately, a review of the Board's decisions reveals that,
notwithstanding the statutory requirement that the Administrator not
be arbitrary and capricious in his final decisionmaking, 146 and the
Board's obligation to the Administrator to "assur[e] consistency in
Agency adjudications" and "assure[] that final decisions represent
with [sic] the position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the
position of ... one Presiding Officer,"' 147 the Board has been unable
to consistently interpret and apply the rules and policies of the
Administrator relating to the determination of penalty amounts in
final decisions of the Administrator.
With regard to some violators, the Board has adopted ALJ
penalty determinations as final decisions of the Administrator,
holding that the ALJs were acting within their discretion in finding
the full amount of penalty proposed by enforcement staff appropriate,
as calculated by an application of the relevant penalty policy of the
Administrator. 148 Moreover, "the Board has emphasized that the
Agency's penalty policies should be applied whenever possible
because such policies 'assure that statutory factors are taken into
account and are designed to assure that penalties are assessed in a fair
and consistent manner,"'' 149 which is what the Administrator's final
penalty orders must manifest to satisfy criteria of the federal
144. See supra, Part I(B)(1).
145. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
146. Id. § 706 (2000).
147. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 22).
148. See, e.g., In re Newell Recycling Co., Inc., 8 E.A.D. 598, 643 (1999)
("Presiding Officer did not err in determining that the proposed $ 1.345 million
civil penalty was an appropriate one."); In re Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd., 9 E.A.D.
302, 321-22 (2000) (stating that "we find no error in the Initial Decision issued by
the Presiding Officer," and "[a]ccordingly, Spitzer is assessed a civil penalty of $
165,000").
149. In re Carroll Oil Co., 10 E.A.D. 635, 656 (2002).
environmental statutes and section 706 of the APA.'5 ° As to other
violators for whom the Administrator's delegated complainants have
proposed a penalty amount for violations determined by an
application of the Administrator's penalty policy to the evidence, and
ALJs in their initial decisions have found a different amount of
penalty appropriate for the same violations without reference to the
policy, the Board also has found no error on the part of the ALJs,
adopting the ALJs' penalty determinations as final decisions of the
Administrator.
On the record under review in In Re V-1 Oil Co., the
Administrator's delegated complainant proposed a penalty of $
36,674 for violations alleged in a complaint, applying the
Administrator's penalty policy to the evidence; the ALJ found a
penalty amount of $ 25,000 to be appropriate for the same
violations. 151 In the Board's own words, the ALJ "based his penalty
assessment solely on the statutory criteria of RCRA section 9006(c),
rather than on the EPA penalty policy implementing the statute on
which the [Administrator's enforcement staff] relied in proposing the
penalty.' 52 Without comment, the Board quoted the AL's analysis
supporting his penalty determination as follows, "[w]hile the use of
this ... [p]enalty [p]olicy may provide for a more consistent national
approach by EPA, and in some cases may even be helpful to the
judge in determining the appropriate penalty to be assessed (see 40
C.F.R. § 22.27(b)), the Environmental Appeals Board is correct in
stating [in In Re Employers Insurance of Wausau and Group Eight
Technology, Incorporated, 6 E.A.D. 735, 759 (1997)] that ultimately
it is the statutory penalty criteria against which the judge is to
measure the facts adduced at hearing and assess a civil penalty. 1 53
Consequently, in contrast to Newel Recycling Company and
Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd., V-1 Oil Company's penalty amount was
determined in complete disregard of the Administrator's penalty
policy, as if the policy were simply a nullity.
In adopting the AL's penalty determination in the final decision
of the Administrator, however, the Board did not comment on the
150. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
151. In re V-I Oil Co., 8 E.A.D. 729, 753-57 (2000).
152. Id. at 753 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 755 n.41.
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relevance of the governing statutes to its action. These statutes
require a consistent national approach in the Administrator's final
decisionmaking 54 and invest the Administrator, not the AU, with
the authority to determine the penalty amount in consideration of the
statutory penalty criteria. 155
In In re John A. Capozzi, the Board noted that it "reserves the
right to closely scrutinize substantial deviations from the relevant
penalty policy" and that it "may set aside the AL's penalty
assessment" where "the AL's reasons for deviating from the penalty
policy are not persuasive or convincing." 15 6 This standard was not
applied. In Capozzi, the Administrator's enforcement staff proposed a
penalty of $ 156,064 for the violations alleged, 157 the amount
determined by an application of the Administrator's RCRA penalty
policy.1 58 In his initial decision, the ALJ found the respondent liable
for the same violations as alleged, but determined that a $ 37,600
penalty amount was appropriate.1 59 Although a review of the initial
decision reveals that the AU completely ignored the Administrator's
154. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (stating that agency decisionmaking shall be held unlawful
if arbitrary or capricious).
155. See SWDA § 9006(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6991e(c) (2000) (stating that an order
"shall... assess a penalty, if any, which the Administrator determines is reasonable
taking into account" the statutory penalty criteria). Nor did the Board explain its
adoption of the AL's penalty determination in light of: (1) the governing rule of
the Administrator requiring the ALJ to consider the penalty policy, 40 C.F.R. §
22.27(b) (the ALJ "shall consider any civil penalty guidelines issued under the Act"
violated)), and the statutory provision making an AL's authority subject to the
rules of the agency, see 5 U.S.C. § 556(c); (2) the Administrator's recognition in his
general penalty policy that "[t]reating similar situations in a similar fashion is
central to the credibility of EPA's enforcement effort and to the success of
achieving the goal of equitable treatment," Policy GM-22, supra note 70, at 27,
and; (3) the Administrator's instruction that the Board is "responsible for assuring
consistency in Agency adjudications by all of the ALJs" and it "assures that final
decisions represent with [sic] the position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just
the position of . . .one [ALJ]." Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the
Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July
23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
156. In re John A. Capozzi, 11 E.A.D. 10, 32 (2003).
157. Id. at 19.
158. Id. at 38-39.
159. Id. at 20.
adopted penalty policy, not even acknowledging its existence, 16° the
Board found and held that "while the AL's rationale for reducing the
penalty is admittedly brief, it is sufficiently reasoned and supported
by the record to constitute an adequate justification for departing
from the [p]enalty [p]olicy."1 61
In the final decision of the Administrator, the Board identifies no
reasons articulated by the ALJ in his initial decision for deviating
from the penalty policy, nor does it offer any explanation as to how
an ALJ can identify persuasive or convincing reasons for departing
from the Administrator's adopted penalty policy, when the ALJ does
not even acknowledge the existence of the policy. 162 As in V-I Oil
Co., the Board does not address governing law. 163
Persistent in its desire to defer to an AL's discretion in his or her
assessment of a penalty, the Board has manifested inconsistency with
regard to the very same penalty policy of the Administrator. In In re
Pacific Refining Company, the Board determined appropriate and
160. In Re Capozzi Custom Cabinets, U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. RCRA-5-2000-
005, 13-21 (Feb. 11, 2002) (initial decision).
161. In reJohnA. Capozzi, 11 E.A.D. at 38.
162. One cannot assume that an ALJ, or any other decision maker, considers
something when there is nothing in the decision maker's written decision to support
such a conclusion. Sound decisionmaking requires that there be findings and an
articulated rational basis appearing in any written decision to support conclusions
and determinations that are made. Final decisions of an administrative agency, such
as the one the Board made on behalf of the Administrator in Capozzi, must be
judged "solely by the grounds invoked by the agency." Burlington Truck Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 169 (1962). See also Harborlite Corp. v.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 613 F.2d 1088, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[A]n
agency's order must be upheld, if at all, 'on the same basis articulated in the order
by the agency itself."'); Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n of
the Dist. of Columbia, 477 F.2d 402, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[T]he articulation of
reasons by an agency-for itself and for the public-does afford a safeguard against
arbitrary and careless action and is apt to result in greater consistency in an
agency's decisionmaking."); Saginaw Broad. Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554, 559 (D.C.
Cir. 1938) ("The requirement of findings is thus far from a technicality. On the
contrary, it is to insure against Star Chamber methods, to make certain that justice
shall be administered according to facts and law."). If an AL's initial decision does
not manifest an articulation of reasons to support the penalty determination being
made, and the Board adopts that initial decision as the final decision of the
Administrator, the Administrator's final decision is likewise legally deficient in this
regard.
163. In re John A. Capozzi, 11 E.A.D. at 38.
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assessed a penalty amount for violations of the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-To-Know Act ("EPCRA"), applying the 1992
penalty policy adopted by the Administrator for the purpose of
determining appropriate penalty amounts for violations of that
statute.1 64 The Board found that, "on the record before us, we discern
no sound reason why the 1992 [policy's] penalty formula for
untimely reporting should not be applied to derive a gravity-based
penalty in this case.0 65 Three years later, however, an AU in a
penalty determination in an initial decision found the very same
policy to be "arbitrary and unauthorized by . . . statute," and the
Board adopted the AL's penalty determination as the final decision
of the Administrator. 166
In his initial decision in In Re Hall Signs, Inc., the ALJ rejected
the penalty formula of the policy itself, noting that, in contrast to the
policy's gravity-based penalty formula, "[i]t would be a simple matter
to construct a matrix or sliding scale with greater flexibility, based
primarily on the amount of chemical involved in the violation, and
perhaps secondarily, on the size of the violator's business." 167 He
noted that "[i]n its determination of 'extent level,' the [Administrator's
penalty policy] in effect considers the size of the violator's business
as at least as significant a factor as the amount of chemical involved
in the violation," and that in his opinion, "[t]here is nothing in
EPCRA that indicates that the size of the business of the violator
should be a significant penalty factor."'168 The ALJ found that "the
[policy's] figure of $ 5,000 [w]as an appropriate minimum gravity-
based penalty for the 'circumstance level 1' violation of failure to
timely report toxic chemical usage ... for relatively minor violations
by businesses of any size," and that, in contrast to the Administrator's
policy, "[t]his type of scheme would more fairly assess penalties
commensurate with the degree to which the violation actually
164. In re Pac. Refining Co., 5 E.A.D. 607 (1994).
165. Id. at 614.
166. In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 8 (Oct.
30, 1997) (initial decision).
167. Id. at 6.
168. Id. at 7.
impaired EPCRA's mission to inform the community of [the]
facilities' release or use of toxic chemicals." 69
The Board, noting that an ALJ "has discretion to assess a penalty
different in amount from the penalty requested in the complaint" and
"may depart from the penalty policy so long as the reasons for
departure are adequately explained,"' 7 ° adopted the initial decision of
the ALJ as the Administrator's final decision, stating that "[a]lthough
the methodology used by the Presiding Officer in calculating the
penalty in this case represents a substantial departure from the
[Administrator's penalty policy], his analysis establishes that he
considered the [Administrator's penalty policy] as required by the
regulations, but did not find it appropriate as applied in this case."''
Although the Board noted that the ALJ limited his finding "to the
facts of this case" and "on this record" and "as applied in this
case," '172 the alleged defects identified by the ALJ were defects
inherent in the policy itself. The ALJ found that the policy matrix
was not sufficiently flexible; 173 EPCRA did not support the policy's
adoption of a "size of violator's business"'174 as a significant factor in
determining a penalty amount; and a type of scheme other than that
stated in the policy "would more fairly assess penalties
commensurate with the degree to which the violation actually
impaired EPCRA." 175 Neither the Board nor the ALJ acknowledged
that, in decisionmaking, an ALJ is not authorized by law to exercise
judicial review of the Administrator's policies, but rather is
169. Id. at 9. Note that the language used by the ALJ- "to construct a matrix;"
"there is nothing in EPCRA that indicates;" "this type of scheme would more fairly
assess penalties commensurate with the degree to which the violation actually
impaired EPCRA's mission"-is language of statutory interpretation and
policymaking, not fact finding on the evidence of record in the particular case
before the ALJ.
170. In Re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency EPCRA Appeal No. 97-6, 5-6
(Dec. 16, 1998) (final order).
171. Id. at 9.
172. Id.
173. In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 6 (Oct.
30, 1997) (initial decision).
174. Id.
175. Id. at9.
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subordinate to the law and policy of the Administrator.'76 Moreover,
the Board did not explain how, in adopting the ALJ's finding that the
Administrator's penalty policy in these regards was "arbitrary and
unauthorized by statute,"'177 such a finding could somehow be
restricted to the Hall Signs case. If the policy is arbitrary,
unauthorized by the statute, and defective, how, by merely applying
it to a different set of facts, can the same policy be cloaked with
authorization under the statute?
Three months later, in In re Catalina Yachts, the Board found that
the very same EPCRA penalty policy "'reasonably implements the
statutory criteria, with a range of penalties to reflect differing
circumstances."' 178 The Board made no mention of its earlier adopted
findings that the policy matrix was not sufficiently flexible, or that
EPCRA did not support the policy's adoption of a "size of the
business of the violator"'179 as a significant factor in determining a
penalty amount, or that another "type of scheme" other than that
stated in the policy would "more fairly assess penalties
commensurate with the degree to which the violation actually
impaired EPCRA."'180  The final decision of the Administrator in
Catalina Yachts, Inc. was upheld on judicial review, with the Court
finding that the Administrator's EPCRA policy was "reasonable and
consistent with the [statute]."181
The Board also has allowed initial decisions of ALJs to become
final decisions of the Administrator, notwithstanding the fact that the
Board directly acknowledged that the penalty determinations in the
decisions were not in compliance with the Administrator's regulations
and policies, and that an adequate explanation for the penalty amount
determined appropriate had not been articulated.
176. See supra note 24 (discussing the distribution of authority between the
Administrator and the ALJs).
177. In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 8 (Oct.
30, 1997) (initial decision).
178. In re Catalina Yachts, Inc., 8 E.A.D. 199, 209 (1999) (citing In re Genicom
Corp., 4 E.A.D. 426, 431 (1992)).
179. In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 6 (Oct.
30, 1997) (initial decision) (adopted by the Board in In Re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S.
Envt'l Prot. Agency EPCRA Appeal No. 97-6 (Dec. 16, 1998) (final order).
180. Id. at 9.
181. Catalina Yachts, Inc. v. EPA, 112 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
In In re Lu Vern G. Kienast, an ALJ issued an initial decision in a
civil penalty enforcement action for CAA asbestos violations. 182
Violations were alleged in an eleven count complaint, and the ALJ
found the respondent liable for violations in nine of those counts.' 83
In explaining his penalty determination, the ALJ acknowledged his
obligations under the Administrator's Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b), and
the Administrator's adopted penalty policy.' 84 The ALJ, however,
simply listed the penalty amounts he was selecting for each of the
nine counts of different violation he had found proven, with no
explanation provided for his selection of those penalty amounts other
than "[tihese penalties are appropriate under the particular facts and
circumstances of this case," and this general conclusion, "[p]ursuant
to 'other factors as justice may require' under Section 113(e) of the
[CAA], the EPA's suggested civil administrative penalty of $113,600
has been reduced to $ 35,000 to account for the size of Respondents'
business, the perceived economic impact of the penalty on the
business and Respondents' good faith efforts to comply with the
requirements of the asbestos NESHAP."185
The ALJ conducted no evidentiary analysis in his initial decision
to provide support for any of his findings and conclusions regarding
his penalty amount determination on any of the nine counts of
violation. Nor was any reason provided by the ALJ for not applying
the Administrator's penalty policy, or for his selection of the
particular amounts of penalty. 186
On September 23, 2003, the Board, on behalf of the
Administrator, issued an "Order Electing to Review Sua Sponte" in
the matter.187 The Board had not received an appeal from either
party, but "determined that the AL's penalty assessment warranted
further review" as "the Board had concerns regarding the sufficiency
of the AL's rationale for reducing [the Complainant's] proposed
penalty from $113,600 to $ 35,000. ' 188
182. In re Lu Ven G. Kienast, No. CAA-5-2001-007 (2003) (initial decision).
183. Id. at 28.
184. Id. at 23.
185. Id. at 24-25.
186. See id.
187. In re Lu Vern G. Kienast, U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency Appeal No. CAA 5-200 1-
007, 2 (Sept. 16, 2004) (Order Revoking Election of Sua Sponte Review).
188. Id.
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A year later, on September 16, 2004, the Board revoked its earlier
order, stating "[n]otwithstanding our reservations about the
sufficiency of the AL's explanation for reducing the proposed
penalty, the Board is disinclined to disturb the AL's $ 35,000 penalty
assessment in view of the totality of the circumstances, including the
fact that neither of the parties has filed a timely appeal. 1 89 No
further reason is given by the Board for adopting the AL's penalty
determination and allowing his initial decision to become the
Administrator's final decision. Although the Board continues to
question "the sufficiency of the ALJ's explanation for reducing the
proposed penalty" by 70%, the Board quite simply "is disinclined to
disturb" the discretion it believes that the AL's "penalty assessment"
must have. 190 The Board does not acknowledge that, in an earlier
final decision it issued on behalf of the Administrator, it found that
the very same penalty policy ignored by the ALJ in In re Lu Vern G.
Kienast "reasonably implements the statutory criteria for assessment
of a penalty under the Clean Air Act,"'19' and that the Board itself
applied the policy in determining an appropriate penalty amount for
CAA asbestos NESHAP violations. 192
In F.R. & S, Inc., the Board, "on its own initiative," issued an
"Order Under 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(b)."'193 Neither Respondent nor the
Administrator's enforcement staff had appealed the AL's initial
decision in the matter to the Board. 194 The Board acknowledged that
it "considered" the initial decision, expressed "concern that the AL's
penalty analysis does not appear to conform fully to the requirements
set forth in the applicable regulations" of the Administrator, but
announced that it "decided not to undertake appellate review of the
decision." 95
The Board noted that, by 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b), the Administrator
requires that an ALJ, in determining appropriate penalty amounts,
"shall consider any civil penalty guidelines issued under the Act,"
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. In re House Analysis & Assocs. & Fred Powell, 4 E.A.D. 501, 508-09 (1993).
192. In re Ocean State Asbestos Removal, Inc., 7 E.A.D. 522, 534-60 (1998).
193. In re F.R. & S, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency Appeal No. CAA 03-2002-0215,
1 (March 17, 2005) (admin. review).
194. Id.
195. Id.
and that "the AU failed to discuss, or even mention, the Agency
penalty policy applicable to the four violations."' 96  The Board
concluded that "it is not clear if the AL considered the policy as
required."' 97 The Board went on to state the following:
In addition, the ALJ significantly reduced the penalty proposed
by the complainant for all four of the violations [from $ 71,500 to $
42,000], but the AU set forth in the Initial Decision specific reasons
explaining the reduction for only one of the violations.' 98
Nonetheless, the Board insists on deferring to the ALJ, stating
that "the Board has decided not to disturb the AL's penalty
assessment even though the ALYs analysis does not fully conform to
the regulatory requirements. The Board's decision not to take review
on its own initiative in this matter should not be viewed as an
endorsement of the AL's departure from the regulatory requirements
of 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b)."' 199
The Board, in its orders in In re Lu Vern G. Keinast and in F.R. &
S., does not acknowledge that Congress, in section 113(d) of the
CAA, invests authority to assess civil penalties for violations of the
CAA exclusively in the Administrator, with no authority invested in
ALJs; 200 that Congress, in section 556(c) of the APA, provides that
an ALT's decisionmaking is subordinate to the rules and policy of the
Administrator; °2 0  that Congress, in section 557(b) of the APA,
provides that the Administrator is responsible for the contents of all
final decisions; 20 2 that Congress, in section 706 of the APA, provides
that final decisions of the Administrator must be consistent, not
arbitrary and capricious;20 3 and that federal courts reviewing final
agency action have maintained a "rigorous insistence on the need for
the conjunction of articulated standards and reflective findings, in
furtherance of even-handed application of law."204
196. Id. at 2.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 3.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (2000).
201. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000); see also supra note 24.
202. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000); see also supra note 28.
203. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
204. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d. 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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Moreover, the Board said nothing in either of these orders
regarding the Administrator having invested in the Board plenary
authority to "set aside the findings of fact and conclusions of law or
discretion contained" in any initial decision of an ALJ,2 5 with
specific instructions that the Board "is responsible for assuring
consistency in Agency adjudications by all of the ALJs," and that the
Board is to "assure[] that final decisions represent with [sic] the
position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the position of...
one Presiding Officer [A]. 206
Given the Board's willingness to allow initial decisions of ALJs
to become final decisions of the Administrator, notwithstanding the
Board's open recognition that the ALJ has not conformed with the
Administrator's Rules in making the decision, and that it does not
endorse the AL's position, it is difficult to see how the Board can
assure consistency in the Administrator's final decisions. It is also
difficult to see how the Board can assure that those decisions
represent the position of the agency as a whole rather that the
position of an individual ALJ.
Initial decisions of ALJs which have become final decisions of
the Administrator by rule,20 7 as they were not appealed by the
Administrator's enforcement staff or otherwise reviewed by the
Board, also have been capricious as a consequence of ALJs rejecting
the Administrator's penalty policies on an ad hoc basis. In In Re
Gypsum North Corp., the Administrator's final decision rejects a
penalty amount of $ 17,600 proposed for a CAA asbestos rule
violation, calculated by applying the Administrator's adopted CAA
penalty policy for asbestos rule violations.208 The ALJ said this about
the Administrator's policy, "Because the [p]olicy operated as an edict,
affording no individualized assessment of the particular facts
surrounding the violation, it failed to comport with the statutory
command that the penalty criteria be considered. Accordingly, the
205. 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(f) (2006).
206. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 22).
207. 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(c) (2007).
208. In Re Gypsum North Corp., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA 02-2001-
1253, 7, 16 (Nov. 1, 2002) (initial decision).
[ALJ] departs from the [p]olicy and looks to the statutory criteria to
determine an appropriate penalty."20
9
The ALJ assessed a penalty amount of $ 1,000.210 This decision
does not recognize, as we have seen, that the Administrator, in an
earlier final decision issued by the Board, found that the very same
penalty policy "reasonably implements the statutory criteria for
assessment of a penalty under the Clean Air Act."211 Nor does it
recognize that the Board had utilized the policy in determining
penalty amounts for CAA asbestos rule violations.212
Similarly, in the initial decision in In re GCA Chemical Corp., the
ALJ rejected the Administrator's adopted penalty policy, and the
penalty amount of $ 37,400 for a party's failure to file two reports
required by TSCA inventory update regulations, because the ALJ
disagreed with certain provisions of the policy and found that the
policy "operates as an edict. '213  The ALJ announced his personal
position that a $ 6,600 penalty was appropriate for the party's failing
to file the two reports.214 This initial decision, now a final decision
of the Administrator, does not recognize that, in an earlier final
decision, the Administrator, by the Board, approved the use of the
very same penalty policy in determining an $ 85,000 penalty amount
appropriate for a party's failure to file five of the very same
215reports. In the final decision in In re GCA Chemical Corp., there
is no attempt to explain how it was that GCA Chemical Company's
failure to file a TSCA inventory update report warranted a penalty
amount 82% below that found appropriate for DIC Americas, Inc.,
which had failed to file the very same report.
Such penalty determinations are driven by the discretion of the
individual ALJs, not the rules and policies of the Administrator. As a
consequence, these final decisions of the Administrator are not
209. Id. at 11.
210. Id. at 16.
211. In re House Analysis & Assocs. & Fred Powell, 4 E.A.D. 501, 508-09 (1993).
212. In re Ocean State Asbestos Removal, Inc., 7 E.A.D. 522, 534-60 (1998).
213. In re GCA Chemical Corp., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. TSCA-4-2000-0130,
1, 11-12 (June 18, 2002) (initial decision).
214. Id. at 20.
215. In re DIC Americas, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 184, 188-93 (1995).
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consistent, but, contrary to the standards of section 706 of the APA,
are arbitrary and capricious. 216
Although the final decisions here reviewed were written by
others, we have seen that the Administrator is responsible for them
all.217 In some final decisions, the Administrator emphasizes that it is
necessary for his penalty policies to be used so as to "assure that
statutory factors are taken into account" and that "penalties are
assessed in a fair and consistent manner." 218 As to some violators,
such as Newell Recycling Company, Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd. and
Catalina Yachts, Inc., the Administrator issues final decisions finding
his penalty policies appropriate vehicles to be used in determining
that a substantial penalty is warranted for violations, as proposed by
his delegated complainant. Yet, as to other violators, such as Hall
Signs, Gypsum North Corporation, GCA Chemical Corporation, Lu
Vern G. Kienast, and F.R. & S., Inc., the Administrator issues final
decisions in which he rejects or ignores his own penalty policy, or
finds his penalty policy defective. Having abandoned his policy in
the second group of cases, the Administrator provides little or no
articulation of how he arrived at the penalty amount determined
appropriate, or how the amount manifests a "conjunction of
articulated standards and reflective findings, in furtherance of even-
handed application of law."219  Nor does the Administrator
demonstrate how he determined a penalty amount appropriate that is
significantly less than that yielded by his policy.
The Administrator leaves unexplained in his decisions how he
can find that his EPCRA penalty policy, as to one violator, is
"arbitrary and unauthorized by statute" because the policy's penalty
216. It must be added that there is no explanation in the Administrator's final
decisions in either In re Gypsum North or In re GCA Chemical Corp. that: (1)
describes how the particular amount of penalty chosen was selected, (2)
distinguishes the earlier decision approving of, and applying, the same policy, or,
(3) describes how the selection of the penalty amount chosen manifested "the
agency's policies effectuat[ing] general standards, applied without unreasonable
discrimination." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d. 841, 851 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
217. See Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 587 F.2d 428, 431-32
(9th Cir. 1978).
218. In re Carroll Oil Co., 10 E.A.D. 635, 656 (2002).
219. Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 852.
matrix is not appropriate under EPCRA,22 ° yet as to another violator
find that the very same policy, including its penalty matrix,
"'reasonably implements the statutory criteria, with a range of
penalties to reflect differing circumstances."' 22 1 Nor does he explain
how his CAA penalty policy, as to one violator, can be found to
"reasonably implement[] the statutory criteria for assessment of a
penalty under the [CAA], 222 yet turn around and, as to another
violator, reject the policy, finding that the very same policy is "an
edict" and "fail[s] to comport with the statutory command that the
penalty criteria be considered. '" 223 He does not explain how he can
find his TSCA penalty policy to be appropriate for determining one
person's TSCA reporting violations,224 yet when confronted with
another person committing the same violations, find the same policy
to "operate[] as an edict," rejecting the policy as a legitimate tool for
use in determining a penalty amount. 225  This is arbitrary and
capricious decisionmaking, contrary to section 706 of the APA.226
Penalty determinations in the Administrator's final decisions turn on
the personal notions and beliefs of whichever one of several ALJs
presided over the matter, rather than on the promulgated rules and
articulated policies of the Administrator. Again, "[w]hen disposition
220. In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 8 (Oct.
30, 1997) (initial decision).
221. In re Catalina Yachts, Inc., 8 E.A.D. 199, 209 (1999) (citing In re Genicom
Corp., 4 E.A.D. 426,431 (1992)).
222. In re House Analysis & Assocs. & Fred Powell, 4 E.A.D. 501, 508-09 (1993).
223. In Re Gypsum North Corp., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA 02-2001-
1253, 11 (Nov. 1, 2002) (initial decision).
224. In re DIC Americas, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 184, 188-92 (1995).
225. In re GCA Chemical Corp., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. TSCA-4-2000-0130,
1, 11-12 (June 18, 2002) (initial decision).
226. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). "It is axiomatic that an administrative agency
either must conform with its own precedents or explain its departure from them."
Ohio Fast Freight, Inc. v. United States, 574 F.2d 316, 319 (6th Cir. 1978).
"[A]gencies are subject to the requirement that they not act arbitrarily or
capriciously and have an obligation to render consistent opinions and to either
follow, distinguish or overrule their own precedent." Chisholm v. Def. Logistics
Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 47 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). An agency "'cannot act
arbitrarily nor can it treat similar situations in dissimilar ways,' and we remand
litigation to the agency when it did not take pains to reconcile an apparent
difference in the treatment accorded litigants circumstanced alike." Garrett v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm., 513 F.2d 1056, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
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depends more on which judge is assigned to the case than on the facts
or the legal rules," it has been recognized that "the tendency is to
describe the system as lawless, arbitrary, or the like."2
27
The point must be emphasized that at issue here is not any
specific amount of penalty for the particular violations committed by
any particular violator. Specific penalty amounts determined
appropriate for violations in specific cases will be fact driven.
Although similar violations may warrant different penalty amounts
being assessed against different violators, the differences will be
predicated on the specific evidence in the case, analyzed in
consideration of a consistent interpretation of statutory penalty
criteria which the Administrator is required, by law, to take into
account in determining the penalty amount he will assess. The
amount of pollutant may vary, or the level of culpability of violators
may differ, and each violator's ability to pay a particular amount of
penalty may differ. As earlier observed, however, Congress permits
penalty amounts from $ 1 or less, up to $ 25,000, to be assessed by
the Administrator for each violation or day of violation of the CAA,
RCRA, EPCRA, and others.228 The interpretation and relative weight
to be given to each of the statutory penalty criteria, and the method
used to apply those criteria to the evidence in the record of a case,
will have a significant impact on whether the penalty amount will be
closer to $ 1 or closer to $ 25,000. As Congress makes the
Administrator, not individual ALJs, responsible for the content of his
final decisions assessing penalty amounts, 229 the Administrator, by
the Board, must exercise control over law and policy to be applied in
his penalty assessment process to assure that arbitrary and capricious
decisions will not issue on his behalf.
Finally, if, as the Board has acknowledged, "penalty policies
should be applied whenever possible because such policies assure
that statutory factors are taken into account and are designed to
'assure that penalties are assessed in a fair and consistent manner' ' 230
does it not follow that a failure to apply such policies will increase
the likelihood that statutory factors are not taken into account, and
227. Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d. 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1982).
228. See supra note 59.
229. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
230. In re Carroll Oil Co., 10 E.A.D. 635, 656 (2002) (emphasis added).
that penalty amounts are not assessed in a fair and consistent
manner? As demonstrated by the numerous decisions of the
Administrator here reviewed-with the Board's explicitly stating its
belief that ALJs "assess" penalties; that in determining the amount of
any penalty, ALJs have independence; and that it will give deference
to penalty determinations of ALJs-the Board's failure to consistently
apply the Administrator's penalty policies has resulted in the
Administrator issuing final orders which do not articulate a
consideration of all statutory penalty criteria, and which assess
penalties which have not been determined appropriate in a fair and
consistent manner.
B. The Application of Law Governing Litigation in the
Administrator's Civil Penalty Process
As earlier observed, in accordance with section 554 of the
APA, 23' the Administrator promulgated rules to "govern all
administrative adjudicatory proceedings" for the assessment of civil
penalties under the various federal environmental statutes. 232
Furthermore, Congress invested ALJs with authority "[s]ubject to
published rules of the agency," 233 and the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia has held that, although an AU must
"conduct the cases over which he presides with complete objectivity
and independence," the ALJ is "governed . ..by applicable and
controlling precedents," and that these precedents include "agency
regulations" and the "agency's policies as laid down in its published
decisions."'234 And, consistent with his statutory duty to issue
decisions that are not arbitrary and capricious, 235 the Administrator
has made the Board "responsible for assuring consistency in Agency
adjudications" and for assuring that his "final decisions represent
with [sic] the position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the
231. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2000).
232. 40 C.F.R. § 22.1 (2006).
233. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000).
234. Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
235. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
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position of . . . one Presiding Officer. ' 236 Consequently, it is the
responsibility of the Board to see that the record of the
Administrator's many final decisions manifests a consistent
interpretation and application of the Administrator's Rules.
Notwithstanding its obligations under the law, the Board has
chosen to defer to various ALJ rulings on issues of law, even though
the ALJs have ignored or rejected the Administrator's promulgated
rules and published decisions in making their rulings. Capricious
decisionmaking has resulted.
1. Motions for Summary Disposition (Accelerated Decision)
By rule, the Administrator provides for summary disposition.237
Reviewing an initial decision in which an ALJ, without conducting
an evidentiary hearing, issued an accelerated decision finding a
respondent liable for violations of TSCA and the proposed penalty
amount of $ 1.345 million appropriate, the Board stated that "we find
that Newell's penalty arguments fail to raise a genuine issue of
material fact and that, consequently, Newell was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing." 238 The Board consequently adopted the AL's
initial decision as a final decision of the Administrator. 239 In other
instances, the Board adopted an initial accelerated decision of an AU
as the final decision of the Administrator, issued without conducting
236. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 22).
237. See 40 C.F.R. § 22.20(a) (2006) (describing "accelerated decisions"); see also
Id. § 22.20(b)(2) (2006) (describing the Presiding Officer's determination of
material facts for a "partial accelerated decision"). In a final accelerated decision of
the Administrator assessing penalties, citing Supreme Court precedent on the
analogous "summary judgment" provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 56, the Board noted that "a party waives its right to an adjudicatory hearing
where it fails to dispute the material facts upon which the agency's decision rests,"
and that "[t]he constitutional right to due process requires that the person claiming
the benefit of that due process must first place some relevant matter into dispute."
In Re Green Thumb Nursery, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 782, 792 (March 6, 1997).
238. In re Newell Recycling Co., Inc., 8 E.A.D. 598, 625 (1999).
239. Id. at 643.
an evidentiary hearing, and assessed a civil penalty on behalf of the
Administrator.24 °
In a subsequent case, when the Administrator's enforcement staff
filed a motion for accelerated decision and the respondent failed to
make any answer to the motion, the ALJ denied the motion without
citation to the criteria of the Administrator's rule241 or agency
precedent, which included In re Green Thumb Nursery, Inc., In re
Newell Recycling Co., Inc., and In re Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd.242
The Administrator's enforcement staff sought interlocutory review of
the AL's order pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 22.29, arguing in its brief
before the Board that the ALJ failed to apply the clear law of the
agency, as set out in the Administrator's Rules, specifically 40 C.F.R.
§ 22.20, and numerous final decisions of the Administrator, including
In re Green Thumb Nursery, Inc., In re Newell Recycling Co., Inc.,
and In re Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd.243
Obviously, as Ritchie Engineering Company made no response at
all to the motion, it could not have identified any genuine issue of
material fact in response to the motion. Enforcement staff
emphasized that if the AL's order was allowed to stand, Ritchie
Engineering Company would be granted a hearing notwithstanding
its failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact, when Green
Thumb Nursery, Newell Recycling Company and Spitzer Great
Lakes had been denied a hearing for the failure to raise such an issue,
and that "inconsistency undermines the even-handed application of
law that is essential to the integrity of the adjudicative process under
240. See In re Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd., 9 E.A.D. 302 (2000) ($165,000 penalty);
see also In re Green Thumb Nursery, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 782 (1997) ($ 3,000 penalty).
241.40 C.F.R. § 22.20 (2006).
242. In re Ritchie Eng'g Co.,Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA-5-2000-019, 1
(Apr. 19, 2001) (order). In his order, without citation to the criteria of 40 C.F.R. §
22.20(a), or any other legal authority, the ALJ denied the unopposed motion,
asserting that documents relied upon in making the motion "are proposed exhibits
only" and "are not yet a part of the evidentiary record." Id. He went on, "Indeed,
whether the proposed exhibits ever become part of the record here, and the weight
to be accorded to them, remains to be seen. In that regard, these proposed exhibits
may be rejected at hearing, EPA may decide to not offer them into evidence, or
they may be explained away by respondent." Id.
243. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Interlocutory Review, In re Ritchie
Eng'g Co., Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA-5-2000-019, 1 (Apr. 19, 2001)
Ritchie Eng'g Co., 4 (June 1, 2001).
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40 C.F.R. Part 22. ' 244 The Board denied interlocutory review in an
order consisting of two sentences, "By motion filed June 1, 2001,
U.S. EPA Region 5 seeks interlocutory review of an order of the
Presiding Officer in this proceeding denying the Regions' motion for
accelerated decision as to liability. Upon review, the Region's motion
for interlocutory review is hereby denied. 245
The Board provided no further explanation for its decision.
While it had the initial decision in In re Ritchie Engineering Co.
under review, the Board issued a final decision in another matter
which involved a respondent's failure to file a response to a motion
for accelerated decision.246 On appeal of the initial decision before
the Board, Billy Yee challenged the enforceability of the
environmental rule he was found to have violated.247 The Board
noted that Respondent "did not file any formal opposition" to
enforcement staffs motion for accelerated decision on the issue of
liability, and that the ALJ "thus concluded that Appellant had waived
any objection to the granting of the motion and ruled that the
[Administrator's delegated complainant] was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law" on Billy Yee's liability for the violations alleged.248
After explaining that accelerated decision in the Administrator's
penalty assessment process ".is governed by an administrative
summary judgment standard, requiring the timely presentation of a
genuine and material factual dispute, similar to judicial summary
judgment,"' citing, among other authorities, In re Green Thumb
Nursery, Inc., the Board stated, "[the Administrator's] Rule 22.16(b).
. provides, in pertinent part, '[a]ny party who fails to respond within
the designated period waives any objection to the granting of the
motion.' 40 C.F.R. § 22.16(b) (2000). Accordingly, by failing to raise
the enforceability of the Disclosure Rule argument before the
Presiding Officer in connection with the Partial Accelerated
244. Id. at 15-16. In support of its argument, enforcement staff cited both Santise v.
Schweiker, 676 F.2d. 925, 930 (1982), and Greater Boston Television Corp. v.
FCC, 444 F.2d. 841, 851 (1970).
245. In re Ritchie Eng'g Co., Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. CAA-5-2000-019,
1 (Apr. 19, 2001) (July 6, 2001) (order denying interlocutory appeal).
246. In re Billy Yee, 10 E.A.D. 1 (2001).
247. Id. at 8.
248. Id. at 10.
Decision, Appellant waived it both below and for purposes of
review. , 2 4
9
Given that, on May 29, 2001, Billy Yee's failure to provide any
response to a motion for accelerated decision was found, under
criteria of the Administrator's Rules and his published decisions, to
constitute a waiver of any issue Billy Yee could have raised therein,
subjecting him to a judgement as to liability for violations alleged,
there would appear to be no reason for the Administrator's process,
on July 6, 2001, to make a different ruling against Ritchie
Engineering Company for its failure to provide any response to a
motion for accelerated decision. By allowing the ALJ's ruling in In re
Ritchie Engineering Co. to stand, a ruling based upon criteria
completely at odds with the precedent cited in In re Billy Yee, the
Board sanctioned inconsistent results for similarly situated
respondents appearing before the Administrator.
2. Determining a Violator's Ability to Pay a Particular Penalty
Amount
Under most federal environmental statues, Congress requires that,
in determining an appropriate amount of civil penalty, the
Administrator consider the violator's financial status and ability to
pay a particular amount of civil penalty. 250  A review of the
Administrator's final decisions manifests capriciousness in addressing
this penalty criteria.
On behalf of the Administrator, the Board has held that, to fulfill
the Administrator's obligation to take into account the "ability to pay"
statutory penalty criteria in a specific case, when his enforcement
staff issues a complaint under his authority, "a respondent's ability to
pay may be presumed," and that presumption can continue until the
respondent's ability to pay the proposed penalty "is put at issue by a
respondent. "251 As under the Administrator's Rules, a respondent is
required in his answer to include his "basis for opposing any
proposed relief' and any hearing requested is to be "upon the issues
249. Id. at 10-11.
250. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2000); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §
2615(a)(2)(B) (2000); FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(4) (2000); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §
11045(b)(1)(C) (2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2000).
251. In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. 529, 541 (1994).
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raised by the complaint and answer,"25 2 if the respondent would
claim he has an inability to pay the proposed penalty, he must raise
the issue in his answer.253 The Board further held that, where the
respondent does raise such a claim, the Administrator's delegated
complainant "must be given access to the respondent's financial
records before the start of [any] such hearing. '254 If the respondent
does not "raise its ability to pay as an issue in its answer," or if after
having raised the claim, it "fails to produce any evidence to support
an inability to pay claim after being apprised of that obligation during
the pre-hearing process," it may be concluded that "any objection to
the penalty based upon ability to pay has been waived under the
Agency's procedural rules.12 5
5
It must be emphasized that in the procedure which it delineated in
In re New Waterbury, Ltd., the Board did not relieve the
Administrator's enforcement staff of any burden that it has at hearing,
imposed by the APA256 and by the Administrator's Rules.257 The
Board did recognize that the Administrator, by rule, requires that to
preserve for hearing a claim on its ability to pay the penalty amount
proposed in the complaint, a respondent must provide notice to the
agency by raising the issue in its answer.258 If a respondent does
raise this issue, it must submit for the Administrator's enforcement
staffs review "financial records before the start of [any] such
hearing." 259 After a financial analyst retained by the Administrator
252.40 C.F.R. § 22.15(b)-(c) (2006).
253. In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. at 542.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000).
257. 40 C.F.R. § 22.24 (2006).
258. 40 C.F.R. § 22.15(a) (2006).
259. In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. at 542. Prior to August 23, 1999, the
Administrator required, by rule, that notices of the proposed penalty order-
identified in his rules as complaints-set forth the amount of civil penalty proposed
for the violations alleged. 40 C.F.R. § 22.14(a)(4) (1998). Subsequent to that date,
the Administrator amended his rules and removed that requirement, which
permitted enforcement staff to issue notices of his proposed penalty orders without
identifying a specific penalty amount. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing
the Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,152
(July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22). He did state that "EPA expects that
administrative complaints containing specific penalty proposals will continue to be
reviews financial documents submitted by respondent and reports to
enforcement staff, if the matter goes to hearing, the Administrator's
enforcement staff continues to bear the burden of demonstrating the
penalty amount proposed is appropriate considering the respondent's
ability to pay as disclosed in its financial records. If the respondent
fails to raise the issue in its answer, or having raised the issue, refuses
or otherwise fails to submit financial documentation upon which its
claim can be determined, the respondent may by rule be deemed to
have waived its claim on the issue.26°
a central part of the Agency's administrative enforcement program." Id. Obviously,
if the Administrator's enforcement staff issues a notice of his proposed penalty
order, i.e., complaint, that does not identify the penalty amount proposed for the
violations alleged, the process identified in In re New Waterbury, Ltd. can have no
efficacy. Where an agency's rules allow for the resolution of issues on pleadings,
the contents of the response are of critical importance, and the need for and
importance of the response in turn enhances the significance of the notice given the
adverse party. In order to be adequate, such notice given by the agency to an
adverse party must contain enough information to provide the respondent a genuine
opportunity to identify material issues of fact. This is needful to provide the 'due
notice and opportunity for hearing' required by the [APA].Hess & Clark, Div. of
Rhodia, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 495 F.2d 975, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1974). If an
alleged violator is not given notice of the amount of penalty proposed for his
alleged violations, it hardly can be said that he has been given a genuine
opportunity to determine whether he has an ability to pay a particular penalty
amount. Id.
260. See In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. at 541-42. A determination of
whether a party is able to pay a particular penalty amount is a conclusion. The
probative facts upon which such a conclusion will be based consist of records
documenting the party's financial condition. Although not cited by the Board in In
re New Waterbury, Ltd., it must be noted that the process which it identified is
supported by well-recognized principles of sound decisionmaking. "The ordinary
rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden upon a litigant
of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary." United
States v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 (1957).
"Ordinarily a litigant does not have the burden of establishing facts peculiarly
within the knowledge of the opposing party." Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am.,
527 F. 2d 843, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In upholding a regulation of the Secretary of
the Interior requiring a mine owner to come forward with information regarding his
mine when challenging an imminent danger order issued under the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that "[a]s respondents logically say, it is, after all, his mine and he had the best
knowledge of its condition." Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operation
Appeals, 523 F.2d 25, 36 (7th Cir. 1975). "Simply stated, the [adverse inference]
rule provides that when a party has relevant evidence within his control which he
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As to some respondents before the Administrator, this is the law
that has been applied. The Board adopted in a final decision of the
Administrator an AL's ruling that the respondent waived its ability
to pay claim, as the respondent, despite providing some financial
documentation, failed to produce the last five years of its parent
corporation's income tax returns. 261 The ALJ, on motion of the
Administrator's enforcement staff, had ordered the respondent to
produce the returns so that the ALJ could make a determination of
respondent's ability to pay.262 In another matter, the Board adopted in
the Administrator's final decision an AL's ruling that a respondent
had waived an initial claim that paying the penalty amount proposed
would "cause a financial hardship that would cause the company to
go out of business," as the respondents "did not raise the ability to
pay argument again, nor did they provide financial records . . .
despite court [ALJ] orders and Complainant requests for such
information. '" 263
Notwithstanding the soundness of the ability to pay
determinations in these final decisions of the Administrator, based
upon In re New Waterbury, Ltd., the Board also has chosen to allow
ALJs the discretion to make ability to pay determinations without
regard to the Administrator's Rules and the precedent it has adopted
on behalf of the Administrator in these decisions. The Board has
fails to produce, that failure gives rise to an inference that the evidence is
unfavorable to him." Int'l Union v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
See also Newell Recycling Co., Inc. v. EPA, 231 F.3d. 204, 210 (5th Cir. 1972) (as
"[s]urely Newell was in possession of such information [of its ability to pay] if
anyone was," and, as there was "'a complete absence of evidence as to Newell's
ability to pay"' in the record, the Administrator "correctly declined to mitigate the
penalty on the basis of Newell's putative inability to pay it."); Bluestone Energy
Design, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 74 F.3d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir.
1996) ("Because Bluestone failed to present a satisfactory picture of its financial
status, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Commission to decline to consider
Bluestone's ability to pay."). Moreover, as financial records of a party are
proprietary in nature, sound policy warrants a rule that allows the party itself to
determine whether it might benefit from the release of such records, and whether it
wishes to release its records.
261. In re Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd. 9 E.A.D. 302, 306- 07 (2000).
262. Id. at 319-20.
263. In re Roger Antkiewicz & Pest Elimination Prods. of Am., Inc., 8 E.A.D. 218,
240 (1999).
adopted such ability to pay determinations in final decisions of the
Administrator.
In one proceeding a respondent, Chempace Corporation, claimed
it did not have an ability to pay the penalty amount proposed in an
administrative complaint filed on behalf of the Administrator. While,
initially, it provided financial documents to the Administrator's
enforcement staff, two years of negotiation yielded no settlement and
a hearing was anticipated. Given the passage of time, the
Administrator's enforcement staff asked the ALJ to order the
respondent to produce the two most recent years of income tax
returns and other financial records, and a financial expert retained by
the Administrator explained in a detailed affidavit accompanying the
discovery motion why she needed this information to conduct an
ability-to-pay analysis. 264 Without any discussion of, or reference to,
the criteria of the Administrator's discovery rules and precedent, 265
the ALJ denied the discovery motion.266  Having denied the
Administrator's enforcement staff the prehearing production of the
two most recent years of Chempace's financial records, the ALJ at
hearing nonetheless permitted the respondent's vice president to
testify, without supporting documentation, as to Chempace's financial
status over those two years.267 Based upon that testimony, and the
two-year-old documentation, the ALJ found the respondent did not
have an ability to pay the $ 200,000 penalty amount proposed, but
that $ 92,123 was an appropriate penalty amount. 268
On review, the Board acknowledged that the ALJ "did not
explicitly recite the factors under 40 C.F.R. § 22.19(f)(1) in denying
the [enforcement staffs] request" for discovery,269 and "it may have
been useful for the [Administrator's enforcement staff] to review the
specific detailed financial information it sought in this case., 270 In
264. In re Chempace Corp., 9 E.A.D. 119, 123-27 (2000).
265. For the current version of these rules, see 40 C.F.R. § 22.19 (2006).
266. In re Chempace Corp., 9 E.A.D. at 126-27.
267. Id. at 125. Enforcement staff made the discovery motion on December 10,
1997. Id. The AU denied the motion on February 27, 1998. Id. at 126-27. The
hearing was conducted on April 7 and 8, 1998. Id. at 127.
268. Id. at 121.
269. Id. at 135.
270. Id. at 134. At the time the AU made the decision, the Administrator's Rules
provided for "other discovery" after the prehearing exchange upon an AL's
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issuing the Administrator's final decision, however, the Board would
not reverse the AL's order denying a discovery request for the two
most recent years of Chempace Corporation's financial records, as "it
appears from our reading of the reasons given by the Presiding
Officer for denying the [motion] ...that such further discovery
would not necessarily have 'significant probative value,"' and, in the
Board opinion, the AU had not abused his discretion.27'
A ruling on a discovery motion is an issue of law and should be
based on whether the party's written discovery request meets the
criteria of the Administrator's rule, 272 not whether a particular
witness's testimony is credible. The determination of an appropriate
penalty amount is an issue of law, policy, and agency discretion, not
fact.273  Furthermore, on matters of law and policy, an AU is
subordinate to the Administrator.274 Despite these rules, the Board
said that "[a]ffording considerable deference to a Presiding Officer's
discovery ruling is particularly appropriate where the issue involved
is the amount of the penalty, an issue for which the Presiding Officer
has broad discretion. '" 275  The Board adopted the AL's initial
determination that such discovery will not in any way "unreasonably delay the
proceeding"; the information sought is "not otherwise obtainable"; and such
information "has significant probative value." 40 C.F.R. § 22.19(e)(1) (1998). The
Board quoted the reasons given by the ALJ for denying the motion, as follows,
"Chempace had 'already produced five years' tax returns and financial statements..
• .If the additional undisclosed documents are shown at the hearing to be relevant
to the penalty assessment, adverse inferences could be drawn against [Chempace's]
position."' In re Chempace Corp., 9 E.A.D. at 135. The rationale of the AU
incorporated no consideration of the criteria identified by the Administrator in his
rule.
271. In re Chempace Corp., 9 E.A.D. at 135.
272. 40 C.F.R. § 22.19(e) (2006).
273. See In re Chautauqua Hardware Corporation, 3 E.A.D. 616, 623 (1991); see
also Panhandle Coop. Ass'n v. EPA, 771 F.2d. 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1985).
274. See supra note 24.
275. In re Chempace Corp., 9 E.A.D. at 135. The Board does not reconcile its
finding that the specific detailed financial information the Administrator's
enforcement staff sought to review may have been useful with its adoption of what
it identified as the AL's reason for excluding that very same information: the
information "would not necessarily have 'significant probative value."' Id. Also, the
Board does not explain why, if the testimony of Chempace Corporation's vice
president regarding the company's financial circumstances over the two years prior
to hearing was not only admissible, but conclusive on the issue of Chempace
Corporation's ability to pay the penalty amount proposed, copies of actual financial
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decision as the final decision of the Administrator, and assessed a $
92,123 penalty.276
In In re CDT Landfill Corp., the Administrator's enforcement
staff filed a complaint which alleged four counts of CAA violations,
and proposed that a $ 72,380 penalty amount be assessed for those
violations.277 The ALJ issued an initial decision finding CDT
Landfill liable for three of the four violations alleged, but assessed no
penalty as he found it without an ability to pay any penalty. 278 The
Board adopted the AL's initial decision as the final decision of the
Administrator.279  The Board acknowledged that CDT Landfill had
not raised an ability to pay claim in the answer it filed, and identified
no effort by the respondent to amend its answer to include that
claim. 8' The Board cited the AL's pre-hearing order, identifying
the following language regarding CDT Landfill's pre-hearing
exchange obligations, "[i]f CDT is contending that the proposed
penalty exceeds its ability to pay or would jeopardize its ability to
continue in business, provide financial statements, copies of income
tax returns or other data to support such contention [by June 2,
2000]. '281
The Board further acknowledged that CDT Landfill "did not
address in its prehearing exchange the issue of its ability to pay a
penalty and did not provide any additional financial statements to
support such an inability-to-pay argument., 282 The Board made no
mention of any effort by CDT Landfill to amend its prehearing
exchange identifying newly discovered evidence. 283 Having failed to
records supporting that testimony "would not necessarily have 'significant
probative value."' Id.
276. Id. at 143.
277. In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. 88, 97 (2003).
278. Id. at 98-99.
279. Id. at 125.
280. Id. at 97.
281. Id. at 98.
282. Id.
283. Notwithstanding CDT Landfill Corporation's failure to raise the issue of its
ability to pay in its answer, in communication with enforcement staff prior to the
filing of the Complaint, it appears to have submitted "three financial schedules"
represented by its attorney to have "estimated CDT's current financial status." Id. at
97. The Board acknowledged, however, that this information "appears to fall
somewhat short of the financial documentation contemplated by the ALJ's
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"1raise its ability to pay as an issue in its answer," and having failed to
allow enforcement staff "access to financial records before the start
of [any] such hearing," 284 CDT Landfill clearly did not meet the
requirements set out in the Administrator's Rules and published
decisions to raise an inability to pay claim at issue at hearing.
Moreover, the Administrator, through the Board, has held "that a
respondent's ability to pay may be presumed until it is put at issue by
a respondent. '285 Therefore, consistent with In re New Waterbury,
Ltd., In re Spitzer Great Lakes, Ltd. and In re Roger Antkiewicz &
Pest Elimination Products of America, Inc., in determining an
appropriate amount of penalty for its violations, the presiding ALJ
and the Board should have presumed that CDT Landfill could afford
to pay the penalty amount proposed or that it had waived any claim
regarding its ability to pay a penalty. This is not what happened.
On January 8, 2001, nine days prior to the scheduled hearing,
CDT Landfill submitted to the Administrator's enforcement staff a
CDT Landfill Corporation "Combined Balance Sheet as of
September 30, 2000" ("Combined Balance Sheet").286  This
document consisted of one page.287 At the hearing, over objection of
enforcement staff, the ALJ admitted the document into evidence.288
The Board noted that "the Combined Balance Sheet ultimately and
significantly influenced [the ALJ's] penalty analysis," in that the ALJ
cited it "as the only evidence in the record of CDT's financial
condition. ' 289 Identifying the balance sheet as evidence of CDT
Landfill's financial hardship, the ALJ held that the "'[c]omplainant
ha[d] totally failed to carry its burden of persuasion as to CDT's
ability to pay,"' and, "[flor those reasons, he declined to assess any
civil penalty against CDT" for the three counts of violation he found
proven.290
Prehearing Order," and that it was "not part of the evidence adduced at hearing." Id.
at 98 n.17.
284. In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. 529, 542 (1994).
285. Id. at 541.
286. In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. at 98.
287. Id. at 112.
288. Id. at 105.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 100.
Although it adopted the AL's ruling that CDT Landfill, at
hearing, could proceed on an ability to pay claim and have the issue
determined in its favor on doing nothing more than presenting a one
page financial summary first tendered nine days prior to the hearing,
the Board provided no analysis to demonstrate how it was that CDT
Landfill could be found to have met its prehearing obligations under
the Administrator's Rules and the precedent of his final decisions.2 91
Rather than evaluate the AL's ruling in consideration of legal
precedent, the Board deferred to the ALJ, "we find that the AM did
not abuse his discretion in admitting the Combined Balance Sheet at
the evidentiary hearing." 292
The Board noted it "has many times stated that it will generally
not substitute its judgment for that of an ALJ absent a showing that
the ALJ committed clear error or an abuse of discretion in assessing a
penalty. '293 As to the Combined Balance Sheet, the Board stated that
"[w]e have also emphasized that '[t]he admission of evidence is a
matter particularly within the discretion of the administrative law
291. See 40 C.F.R. § 22.15 (2006) (noting that a respondent must raise the issue of
its ability to pay in its answer so as to make it subject matter for hearing); see also
In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. 529, 542 (1994) ("[I]n any case where ability
to pay is put in issue, the [Administrator's enforcement staff] must be given access
to the respondent's financial records before the start of such hearing.").
292. Id. at 125. Careful analysis reveals that the prehearing order of the ALJ itself
was not in accordance with law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). As we have seen,
relevant agency law is that hearings are to be "upon the issues raised by the
complaint and answer." 40 C.F.R. § 22.15(c) (2006). (a respondent must raise an
issue in its answer so as to make it subject matter for hearing. This section does not
specifically address the ability to pay issue, but rather sets forth a general pleading
requirement placed on respondents.). Also, "a respondent's ability to pay may be
presumed until it is put at issue by a respondent." In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5
E.A.D. at 541. CDT Landfill failed to raise the ability to pay issue as required by
the Administrator's Rules and published decisions. On the record of the pleadings,
CDT Landfill's ability to pay was not at issue and was to be presumed, given that
agency precedent governs AU decisionmaking. See Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996
F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Notwithstanding CDT Landfill's failure to
comply with the Administrator's requirements for raising the issue, and the clear
agency precedent, the AU chose to issue an order informing CDT Landfill that it
continued to have the option of raising the ability to pay issue by providing loosely
specified financial information in its future prehearing exchange. In re CDT
Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. at 99-100. Consequently, the AL's prehearing order was
not in accordance with law.
293. In re CDTLandfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. at 117.
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judge.' 294 In reaffirming its desire to defer to the assigned ALJ on
evidentiary rulings, the Board described its relationship with the ALJ
as analogous to a federal reviewing court's relationship with an
agency by stating, "[flederal district and circuit courts have similarly
recognized agency discretion in making evidentiary decisions during
administrative proceedings. " 295
The Board's attempted analogy is not in conformance with the
law. In contrast to a federal reviewing court's recognition of agency
discretion, based upon the court's limited role on review and an
acknowledgment of the agency's expertise,296 the APA explicitly
294. Id. at 108.
295. Id. It must be observed that the evidentiary issue is one of law, not of fact. The
issue is whether a one page summary can ever be probative on the issue of a
respondent's ability to pay if the respondent has failed to raise that issue, and failed
to provide financial documents to support the conclusions of the tendered summary
and an ability to pay claim prior to the hearing. Had the Board "exercise[d] its own
judgment" in identifying a legal rationale for the admission of the one page
summary, "according to its own understanding and conscience," U. S. of Am. Ex
Rel. Joseph Accardi, 347 U.S. at 266-67, rather than deferring to the ALI, it would
have had a difficult time of it. In addition to the Respondent's failure to raise the
"ability to pay" issue in its answer, and to provide its financial records prior to
hearing, the Board acknowledged that the ALI had "not specifically address[ed] the
[one page summary's] reliability at the hearing"; that the document itself was
"undated and had not been further explained by testimony,"; and that "there was no
analysis or explanation for the 'very large closure cost liability' referenced in the
document." In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. at 113. Moreover, in considering
the probative value of summaries, federal courts have recognized that "[t]he
proponent of a summary must establish a foundation that (1) the underlying
materials upon which the summary is based are admissible in evidence; and (2) the
underlying documents were made available to the opposing party for inspection."
Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1984). See also
White Indus., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, 1077-78 (W.D. mo.
1985) (stating that tendered testimony "in verbal summary form" of "personal
examination of certain documents" is an "unabashed attempt to prove the contents
of document without producing either the originals or appropriate copies thereof.").
Whether CDT Landfill Corporation made a sufficient foundation for its one page
financial summary to be found probative and admitted into evidence, consistent
with 40 C.F.R. § 22.22(a) of the Administrator's Rules, does not depend upon an
evaluation of the demeanor of any witness, observed exclusively by the ALJ. It
depends upon the persuasiveness of arguments supporting and opposing the
admission of the document, arguments as accessible to the Board on review as they
were to the ALJ.
296. Brock v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 801 F.2d. 926, 932 (7th Cir. 1986).
provides that an ALJ is subordinate to the rules of the agency on
matters of law.2 97 Furthermore, the agency is specifically responsible
for the contents of its final decisions, with plenary authority to set
aside an AL's ruling on issues of law,298 and the agency is obliged to
issue decisions which are consistent and not arbitrary and
299capricious.
Two years after issuing In re CDT Landfill Corp., the Board
issued the Administrator's final decision in In re JHNY, Inc.3 °° In this
decision, the Board adopted a default order of the ALJ, issued on the
failure of JHNY, Inc., to submit a prehearing exchange as required by
rule and the AL's order.30 1 In the Administrator's final decision, the
Board cited In re CDT Landfill Corp. not as precedent for the Board's
interpretation of any relevant rule, but rather as precedent for its
deferential review standard regarding AU decisionmaking, stating "it
has been the Board's longstanding practice to accord substantial
deference to ALJs in conducting proceedings under the
[Administrator's Rules], particularly with regard to prehearing
exchange and discovery. As we have observed, '[o]ur rules depend on
the presiding officer to exercise discretion throughout an
administrative penalty proceeding. '"' 30 2
Although JHNY, Inc., had failed to submit a prehearing
exchange, it earlier had raised as an issue its ability to pay the penalty
amount proposed, and, prior to the AU having ordered the
prehearing exchange, voluntarily submitted to the Administrator's
enforcement staff tax returns, balance sheets and statements of
operation. 303  Nonetheless, the Board adopted the ALJs ruling
denying JHNY, Inc. a hearing, noting that "[b]y compelling the
parties to provide [all evidence to be used at hearing and other related
information] in one central submission, the prehearing exchange
clarifies the issues to be addressed at hearing and allows the parties
and the [ALJ] an opportunity for informed preparation for
297. See'5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000); see also supra note 24.
298. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
299. Id. § 706.
300. In re JHNY, Inc., 12 E.A.D. 372 (2005) (final order).
301. Id. at 374, 380.
302. Id. at 385.
303. Id. at 379.
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hearing." 30 4 The Board observed that JHNY, Inc. "did not provide
information documenting its financial condition as prescribed by the
prehearing information exchange requirements, and its failure to do
so interfered with the purpose of the [Administrator's Rules]. 305 The
Board specifically reaffirmed the ruling of In re New Waterbury,
Ltd., "where a respondent does not raise its ability to pay as an issue
in its answer, or fails to produce any evidence to support an inability
to pay claim after being apprised of that obligation during the pre-
hearing process," the respondent may be found to have waived "any
objection to the penalty based upon ability to pay. 30 6
The rules and precedent that the Board, on behalf of the
Administrator, identified and applied in JHNY, Inc., however, are
rules and precedent the Board ignored in assessing penalties against
CDT Landfill, Inc. and Chempace Corporation. As we have seen,
CDT Landfill, Inc. failed to raise the ability to pay issue in its
answer, and, notwithstanding the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 22.19
and the AL's prehearing order, failed to include any financial
information in its prehearing exchange. 30 7  Consequently, if the
precedent reaffirmed in In re JHNY, Inc. had been applied by the
Administrator's decision makers to In re CDT Landfill Corp., CDT
Landfill Corporation would have been found to have waived any
ability to pay claim it had, and its penalty amount could not have
been reduced to $ 0 based upon nothing more than a one-page
unsigned Combined Balance Sheet first submitted a week before the
hearing. Regarding Chempace Corporation, as the Administrator's
Rules and In re New Waterbury, Ltd. provide that, on having raised
an ability to pay claim, a respondent must "submit evidence to
support i[t]s claim as part of the pre-hearing exchange" or may be
deemed to have waived such a claim,3 8 it follows that the
enforcement staffs motion should have been granted over Chempace
Corporation's objection, and Chempace Corporation should have
been ordered to provide the two most recent years of its financial
records. If Chempace Corporation did not provide those records it
304. Id. at 382.
305. Id. at 391.
306. Id. at 397 (citing In re New Waterbury, Ltd., 5 E.A.D. 529, 542 (1994)).
307. In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. 88, 97 (2003).
308. In reJHNY, Inc., 12 E.A.D. at 397.
would be deemed to have waived the claim. Rather than consistently
rule on the ability to pay issue based upon a "conjunction of
articulated standards and reflective findings, in furtherance of even-
handed application of law," 309 the Board has allowed the disposition
of cases to depend more upon which AU presided in the case. 310
Aside from the inconsistent outcomes on the ability to pay issue
manifested in these final decisions of the Administrator, the Board's
adoption of a deferential standard of review is itself inconsistent with
the position of the Administrator announced by his CJO in an earlier
final decision. The Board supports its adoption of the deferential
review standard of an AL's decisionmaking by making an analogy to
the deferential standards applied by federal appellate courts when
reviewing agency decisions. 311 Citing section 557(b) of the APA and
case law, however, the Administrator's CJO recognized that "[t]he
Administrator has the responsibility for making final agency
decisions, which comprehends the right to review the entire record
and draw his own conclusion from the evidence," and that "the
relation between the AU and agency is not the same as or even
closely similar to the relation between agency and reviewing court."
312 The Board does not explain its departure from In re Martin
Electronics, Inc., nor does the Board explain how it can fulfill its
obligation to the Administrator to "assur[e] consistency in Agency
adjudications by all of the ALJs" and "assure that the final decisions
represent with [sic] the position of the Agency as a whole, rather than
just the position of ... one Presiding Officer," 313 when it finds that
an ALJ has the discretion to rule on issues of law without regard to
309. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d. 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
310. "When disposition depends more on which judge is assigned to the case than
on the facts or the legal rules, the tendency is to describe the system as lawless,
arbitrary, or the like." Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d. 925, 930 (1982) (citing
Mashaw, Conflict and Compromise Among Models of Administrative Justice,
1981 DUKE L.J. 181, 182 n.4. (1981).
311. In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. at 108 ("Federal district and circuit
courts have similarly recognized agency discretion in making evidentiary decisions
during administrative proceedings.").
312. In re Martin Electronics, Inc. 2 E.A.D. 381, 394- 95 n.18 (1987) (citing 3
Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 17:16 (2d ed. 1980)).
313. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 22).
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relevant precedent as set forth in provisions of the Administrator's
Rules and his published decisions.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The Supreme Court has long recognized that, "Our system of
jurisprudence rests on the assumption that all individuals, whatever
their position in government, are subject to federal law ... No man in
this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law
may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the
government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law,
and are bound to obey it." 314
Consequently, agency decision makers must comply with
governing statutes and agency regulations. "It is axiomatic that an
agency must act in accordance with applicable statutes and its
regulations," and "'[t]he agency has no discretion to deviate' from the
procedure mandated by its regulatory scheme. 3 15  In Service v.
Dulles, the United States Supreme Court sustained the contention that
"regulations validly prescribed by a government administrator are
binding upon him as well as the citizen, and that this principle holds
even when the administrative action under review is discretionary in
nature." 316 Similarly, in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Whitman, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals criticized actions of the
Administrator regarding a compliance order because the Board and
the presiding ALJ "manufactured the procedures they employed on
the fly, entirely ignoring the concept of the rule of law," and applied
agency rules "on a purely ad hoc basis."317
Moreover, procedures established by Congress, and by executive
officers vested with authority by Congress to establish procedures,
cannot be set aside by anyone with a preconceived idea that
314. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (citing United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196, 220 (1882)).
315. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. West, 138 F.3d 1434, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 544 (1988)). See also Associated
Builders & Contractors of Tex. Gulf Coast Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 451
F.Supp. 281, 287 (S.D. Tex. 1978) ("[i]t is also true that individual government
agents cannot escape adherence to governmental regulations.").
316. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957).
317. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1246 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
procedure should be something other than that identified by Congress
and responsible chief executive officers. Again, according to the
Supreme Court, "[w]hen a statute limits a thing to be done in a
particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode." 318
Consequently, when Congress specifies the process that is to govern
penalty assessment and agency adjudications, as it has in the federal
environmental statutes and section 554 of the APA, its specification
of the identified process includes the negative of any other mode of
process.31 9
The law governing the Administrator's assessment of civil
penalties for violations of the federal environmental statutes is clear,
"(a)The only person authorized by Congress to assess, and determine
the amount of, civil penalties for violations of the federal
environmental statutes is the Administrator,3"' the Administrator has
promulgated rules to govern the process by which he will exercise his
discretion to do so, 321 and he has issued policies to guide those who
participate in his civil penalty assessment process.
' 322
"(b)Congress has vested authority in ALJs only to initially decide a
matter on behalf of an agency 32 3  - in the circumstances under
discussion, the agency being the Administrator-and provided that
318. Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). See also
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458
(1974).
319. This canon of statutory construction also applies to the interpretation of the
Administrator's rules and regulations. Rucker v. Wabash R.R. Co., 418 F.2d 146,
149 (7th Cir. 1969) ("[a]dministrative regulations, like statutes, must be construed
by courts, and the same rules of interpretation are applicable in both cases.").
Consequently, when the Administrator's Rules "limits a thing to be done in a
particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode." Botany Worsted Mills,
278 U.S. at 289. For instance, when the Administrator, by rule and published
decisions, identifies three criteria which an ALJ must consider in determining
whether to grant a motion for summary disposition and deny an oral evidentiary
hearing, an ALJ cannot ignore those criteria and rule on such a motion based upon
different criteria more to his own personal liking.
320. See supra Part I.B. 1.
321. See supra Part 11.
322. See supra note 70.
323. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
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decisionmaking of an ALJ shall be subject to the law and policy of
the agency." 324
"(c) Congress has provided that the agency, i.e. the Administrator, is
responsible for the contents of its final decisions,3 25 and it has
provided that a reviewing court shall hold unlawful final agency
decisions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."326
Rather than recognize in the process established by Congress that
it is the Administrator who is vested with the exclusive authority to
assess and to determine civil penalties for violations of the federal
environmental statutes, the Board in its decisions has taken the
position that each of the several ALJs assess civil penalties under
these statutes, and in determining the amount of penalty to assess,
each ALJ is independent. The Board has stated that in determining
the amount of penalty to assess, the ALJ "has a choice of either
following or deviating from" the Administrator's penalty policies,
which choice "operates to preserve not restrict the [AL's]
independence[;] ' '327 that an AU can "reject[] an 'appropriate' penalty
generated in accordance with the [Administrator's] [p]enalty [p]olicy,
in favor of another 'appropriate' penalty" amount the AU finds
"better suited to the circumstances of [the] particular case[;]" 328and
that, given an "AL's authority to assess a penalty," the
Administrator's policy "does not limit the AL's authority to assess a
penalty that is otherwise in accordance with the statutory factors."329
The Board's position does not account for the language of the
federal environmental statutes and the APA, as well as efforts made
by the Administrator to assure that his final decisionmaking will be
in conformance with applicable requirements of those statutes. The
Administrator requires ALJs to consider various penalty policies
324. Id. § 556(c).
325. Id. § 557(b).
326. Id. § 706.
327. In re DIC Ams, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 184, 190-91 (1995).
328. In re Employers Ins. Of Wausau & Group Eight Tech., Inc., 6 E.A.D. 735, 759
(1997).
329. In re U.S. Army, Fort Wainwright Cent. Heating & Power Plant, 11 E.A.D.
126, 172 (2003).
when determining appropriate penalty amounts in their initial
decisions for violations of the federal environmental statutes.33 ° The
policies are the Administrator's interpretations of statutory penalty
criteria which Congress, in the federal environmental statutes, directs
the Administrator to consider in determining penalty amounts he will
assess.331 These policies, issued by senior officers to whom he has
delegated his policy-making authority, incorporate the
Administrator's adopted methodologies for determining penalty
amounts. The Administrator's use of such policies is based upon
sound observation: the "consistent application of a penalty policy" is
necessary "because otherwise the resulting penalties might be seen as
being arbitrarily assessed," and "[tireating similar situations in a
similar fashion is central to the credibility of EPA's enforcement
effort. 3 32  Is it not true that, in determining appropriate penalty
amounts for violations of the federal environmental statutes, treating
similar situations in a similar fashion is necessary to assure that
penalty amounts assessed by the Administrator against violators will
be in conformance with section 706 of the APA,333 and not be
arbitrary or capricious? Rather than act upon its responsibility to the
Administrator for assuring consistency in the Administrator's
adjudications, and "assur[ing] that final decisions represent with [sic]
the position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the position of
... one Presiding Officer,"334 the Board has "many times stated that it
will generally not substitute its judgment for that of an AU absent a
showing that the AU committed clear error or an abuse of discretion
in assessing a penalty. 3 35
While on occasion the Board has articulated the need for applying
the Administrator's policies, and used the policies to support penalty
amounts assessed in some final decisions of the Administrator, 336 the
Board has been equally willing to adopt in other final decisions of the
330. 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) (2006).
331. See supra note 12.
332. Policy GM-22, supra note 70, at 27.
333. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
334. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 22).
335. In re CDT Landfill Corp., 11 E.A.D. 88, 117 (2003).
336. See supra notes 148-49.
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Administrator penalty determinations of an ALJ where the AL's
determination is based upon the statutory criteria rather than the
Administrator's policy;337 where the AL's determination fails to
recognize the existence of the Administrator's policy;338 where the
AL's determination results from his finding that the Administrator's
policy is "arbitrary and unauthorized by the statute;" 339 and where the
Board openly recognizes that the ALJ "failed to discuss, or even
mention, the Agency penalty policy,"34  that his penalty
determination "does not fully conform to the regulatory
requirements," 341 and that the Board does not endorse the AL's
determination.342 From the language of its decisions, it appears that
the Board, as well as the ALJs assigned to the agency, have
overlooked a fundamental and distinctive principle of the statutory
administrative process: all authority exercised in the Administrator's
penalty assessment process, whether by delegated complainants,
ALJs, or the Board, is authority held by the Administrator and
assigned to these officers, and, as a consequence of the assignment,
each officer acts subject to the Administrator's law and policy.343
The effect of this principle can be illustrated readily. The federal
environmental statutes require that before the Administrator may
assess a penalty, which the Administrator must determine by
evaluating the evidence in consideration of the statutory penalty
criteria, the Administrator must provide to the alleged violator a
337. In re V-I Oil Co., 8 E.A.D. 729, 753 (2000).
338. In re John A. Capozzi, 11 E.A.D. 10, 38-39 (2003).
339. In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 8 (Oct.
30, 1997) (initial decision).
340. In re F.R. & S, Inc., U.S. Envt' Prot. Agency Appeal No. CAA 03-2002-0215,
2 (March 17, 2005) (order).
341. Id. at 1.
342. Id. at 3.
343. Although ALJs are independent fact-finders and initial decision makers by
statute of Congress, they are subordinate to the Administrator on matters of law and
policy. See supra note 24. The Board is subordinate to the Administrator as the
Board is a creation of the Administrator. See 57 Fed. Reg 5320 (Feb. 13, 1992).
The Administrator's delegated complainants and enforcement staff, who issue and
prosecute his notices of proposed penalty orders (i.e., complaints), are subordinate
by virtue of the delegation.
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notice of the proposed penalty order.344 Both the Administrator's
delegated complainant signing a notice of the proposed penalty order
and the Board issuing the final order assessing civil penalties are
each delegated authority to so act from the very same
Administrator.345 An AL's authority to preside over the litigation of
an action, and to issue initial decisions, is assigned by the same
Administrator.346
The penalty amount found appropriate in the initial decision of an
ALJ and the penalty amount assessed in the final decision of the
Board may differ from that proposed by the Administrator's
delegated complainant. Reasons for this may be that evidence in the
final record differs from that relied upon when the complaint was
prepared and issued, or the Administrator's delegated complainant
incorrectly applied the policy. If consistent, non-arbitrary, and non-
capricious agency action is the goal, however, it is irrational for the
Administrator to provide one interpretation of the statutory penalty
344. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4) (2000); TSCA 15 U.S.C. §
2615(a)(2)(A) (2000); FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(3) (2000); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §
11045(b)(1)(B) (2000); CAA 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2) (2000); SDWA 42 U.S.C. §
300g- 3(g)(3) (2000); MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (2000); SWDA, 42 U.S.C. §
6928(a)(2) (2000).
345. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia described the
exercise of the Office of Thrift Supervision's statutory enforcement process, which
also is governed by the APA, as follows: A notice of charges may be issued when
the agency has 'reasonable cause to believe' that the respondent is engaging in
unsafe or unsound practices or is otherwise violation the law. 12 U.S.C. §
1818(b)(1). The notice is in the nature of a complaint. In issuing a notice, the OTS
Director is performing a prosecutorial function. Ultimately, the Director may
perform a different role in the same case, acting as a quasi-judicial officer passing
judgment on the evidence bearing on the charges. Although the Administrative
Procedure Act generally forbids agency personnel from engaging in both the
prosecution and the decision of a case, an exemption permits a member of the body
comprising the agency to wear both hats. Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift
Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 212 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1998)(citations ommitted). Likewise,
in the federal environmental statutes, Congress provides that "the Administrator"-
who, as we have seen, is the "agency" under the APA-is to issue both the "notice"
of the proposed penalty order, and issue the final order "assessing" the penalty,
determining the amount of penalty in consideration of the statutory penalty criteria
identified by Congress. See supra Part I(B)(1) and note 20. The exemption, in part,
reads as follows, "This subsection does not apply . . . (C) to the agency or a
member or members of the body comprising the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)(C).
346. 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.4(c), 22.27(a) (2006).
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criteria and a penalty determination methodology for proposing
penalty amounts to assess, yet allow other differing interpretations
and methodologies, or no interpretation and methodology at all, for
use in determining penalty amounts the Administrator will actually
assess. Likewise, if consistent, non- arbitrary, and non-capricious
decisionmaking is the goal, it is irrational to adopt in final decisions
of the Administrator penalty amount determinations made by each of
the ALJs based upon their own personal notions of statutory
interpretation, policy and fairness, ignoring or rejecting the
Administrator's statutory interpretations and adopted penalty
calculation methodologies set out in his policies.
The Administrator is also responsible for all rulings of law made
in the administrative record out of which the final decision issues.
When rulings on points of law-for example, whether an issue has
been properly raised for hearing; whether summary disposition is
appropriate; whether prerequisites have been met by a party so as to
enable it to have information introduced into evidence-are not made
by applying the criteria of the Administrator's promulgated rules and
published decisions, but are made based upon a particular AL's
personal notions of fairness, any inconsistencies, i.e., arbitrary and
capricious rulings, are the responsibility of the Administrator. 347
Inconsistencies in statutory interpretation and penalty calculation
methodologies applied by decision makers in determining
appropriate penalties to be assessed by the Administrator, and
inconsistencies in criteria applied by ALJs in ruling on issues raised
in litigation, cannot be written off to the unavoidable diversity in
views of each of the several decision makers as, by section 557(b) of
the APA, Congress makes the Administrator responsible for all final
decisions, allowing him to reject in whole or in part any finding or
conclusion in any initial decision of an ALJ.348 Moreover, in section
706 of the APA, Congress requires that the Administrator's final
decisions be consistent and not arbitrary and capricious. 349 Again,
the Administrator's delegation of his decision- making authority
347. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
348. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
349. Id. § 706(2)(a).
"[does] not ...relieve him of the responsibility for action taken
pursuant to the delegation.
3 50
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recognized the need for administrators to exercise control over their
decisionmaking process, and the dangers presented when that
responsibility is not met, "To protect these interests [life, health, and
liberty] from administrative arbitrariness, it is necessary, but not
sufficient, to insist on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative action.
For judicial review alone can correct only the most egregious abuses.
Judicial review must operate to ensure that the administrative process
itself will confine and control the exercise of discretion. Courts
should require administrative officers to articulate the standards and
principles that govern their discretionary decisions in as much detail
as possible. Rules and regulations should be freely formulated by
administrators, and revised when necessary. Discretionary decisions
should more often be supported with findings of fact and reasoned
opinions. When administrators provide a framework for principled
decision-making [sic], the result will be to diminish the importance
of judicial review by enhancing the integrity of the administrative
process, and to improve the quality of judicial review in those cases
where judicial review is sought. 3 51
The Administrator is an administrative officer who, consistent
with his obligations under the federal environmental statutes and the
APA, has set out in detail standards and principles that are to govern
his discretionary decisions. These standards and principles are in his
promulgated rules, and the penalty policies he has issued through his
delegated policy-making officers. This is the "framework for
principled decision-making [sic]"352 that the Administrator has
provided for those who serve him and are subordinate to him on
matters of law and policy, including the Board, ALJs and his
delegated complainants. But the concerns expressed by the Court
cannot be satisfied when the Administrator's decision makers adopt a
belief that their decisionmaking is independent of this framework
established by the Administrator and ignore it. Nor can those
350. Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 587 F.2d. 428, 431-32 (9th
Cir. 1978).
351. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(citations omitted).
352. Id.
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concerns be met when the Board will adopt as a final decision of the
Administrator an initial decision of an ALJ which the Board does not
endorse,353 and which the Board finds "does not appear to conform
fully to the requirements set forth in the [Administrator's]
regulations. '" 3
54
The same Court, addressing integrity in a legal process, has
recognized that "[s]trategic or merely lazy circumventions of a legal
process grounded in a sound policy have the effect of eroding the
regularized, rational character of litigation to the detriment of
practitioners and clients alike." 355
Strategic design and laziness are not the only ways in which a
legal process can be circumvented and eroded. When ALJs are
recognized to have the discretion to rule on issues of law without
regard to criteria established by the Administrator in his promulgated
rules and published decisions, and each of several ALJs informs his
or her rulings with no more than his or her own personal notions of
fairness regarding any issue at hand, there is also a "circumvention[]
of a legal process" which can "have the effect of eroding the
regularized, rational character of litigation to the detriment of
practitioners and clients alike." 356 Under such circumstances, parties
to a proceeding cannot know ahead of time whether the particular
ALJ presiding will apply the Administrator's rules and policies or
whether the ALJ will apply his or her own notions of process and
policy, and without knowing what if any legal standards and policy
premises will be applied, competent and professional preparation of
cases by parties simply is not possible. Moreover, without the
consistent application of agency legal standards and policy premises,
it is not possible for the agency to provide meaningful training to
staff attorneys who prepare and present these cases on behalf of the
Administrator. Finally, as the entire purpose of the Administrator's
penalty assessment process is to provide a deterrent to those who
would otherwise damage the environment or put it at risk, any
erosion of the regularized, rational character of litigation carried on
353. In re F.R. & S, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency Appeal No. CAA 03-2002-0215,
3 (March 17, 2005) (admin. review).
354. Id. at 1.
355. Harris v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 345 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
356. Id.
in that process is a detriment to the Administrator's client, the public
interests Congress sought to further in the federal environmental
statutes.
A distinctive characteristic of the administrative process is that
the judge in the process has legal authority only to issue initial
decisions, and in doing so is "[s]ubject to the published rules of the
agency," with the agency responsible for the content of the final
decision.357 In addressing the role of an AU, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals has recognized the following, "The basic concept of the
independent administrative law judge requires that he conduct the
cases over which he presides with complete objectivity and
independence. In so operating, however, he is governed, as in the
case of any trial court, by the applicable and controlling precedents.
These precedents include the applicable statutes and agency
regulations, the agency's policies as laid down in its published
decisions, and applicable court decisions .... [O]nce the agency has
ruled on a given matter, [moreover,] it is not open to reargument by
the administrative law judge; . . . although an administrative law
judge on occasion may privately disagree with the agency's treatment
of a given problem, it is not his proper function to express such
disagreement in his published rulings or decisions.358
Consequently, in determining an appropriate amount of penalty
for violations in an initial decision, an AU is bound by law to
comply with the Administrator's Rules. Specifically, an ALJ must
consider the Administrator's penalty policy, and, if determining a
penalty amount appropriate other than the amount proposed by the
Administrator's delegated complainant, an AU must "set forth in the
initial decision the specific reasons for the increase or decrease." 359 In
determining whether to grant a motion filed during the litigation of
any penalty action before the Administrator, the AU is bound by law
to rule on the motion by applying criteria identified in the
Administrator's promulgated rules and published decisions, as such
rules and decisions are applicable precedent.
357. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(c), 557(b) (2000).
358. Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d. 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Joseph
Zwerdling, Reflections on the Role of an Administrative Law Judge, 25 ADMIN. L.
REv. 9, 12-13 (1973)).
359. 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) (2006).
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No particular penalty policy of the Administrator, or, for that
matter, a particular promulgated rule, is sacrosanct. Based upon
experience, rules and policies may be in need of periodic revision.
On judicial review, a violator who challenges the amount of penalty
assessed by the Administrator, determined by an application of his
penalty policy, may be able to convince a reviewing court that the
policy, in whole or in part, is "arbitrary and unauthorized by
statute, 3 60 that it "operates as an edict, ' 361 or that in some other
manner it is defective. 362
Likewise, a court may determine on judicial review that some
procedural regulation of the Administrator is defective as a matter of
law. When a federal statute provides for judicial review in a U.S.
District Court or U.S. Court of Appeals, it is the duty of the
reviewing court to make those determinations. Congress, however,
has not invested ALJs with the authority of a court of judicial review.
An ALJ is a "creature of congressional enactment" and a "semi-
independent subordinate hearing officer" 363 whose decisionmaking
Congress makes subordinate to the Administrator on matters of law
360. In re Hall Signs, Inc., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. 5-EPCRA-96-026, 6 (Oct.
30, 1997) (initial decision).
361. In re GCA Chemical Corp., U.S. Envt'l Prot. Agency No. TSCA-4-2000-0130,
12 (2002).
362. When challenged on judicial review, courts have upheld penalty amounts
assessed by the Administrator in final decisions issued by the Board, determined by
applying the Administrator's adopted penalty policy. An assessed penalty of $
108,792 for EPCRA violations was upheld, notwithstanding that, in his initial
decision, the ALJ found a penalty amount of $ 39,792 to be appropriate. See
Catalina Yachts, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, CV99-07357 (C.D.D.C. Calif. 2000). An
accelerated decision assessing a penalty of $ 1.345 million for TSCA violations
was upheld. Newell Recycling Co., Inc. v. EPA, 231 F.3d 204, 208-09 (5th Cir.
2000). A final penalty order issued by the Board assessing a $ 175,000 penalty for
FIFRA violations was upheld. Sultan Chemists, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 281 F.3d 73 (3rd
Cir. 2002). In Newell Recycling Company, Inc., the Court noted that "[t]he Penalty
Policy makes the gravity-based determination process mostly mechanical by
pegging the above-described factors (the nature, circumstances, gravity and extent
of the violation [footnote omitted]) to statistical benchmarks or fixed formulations,"
but, based upon the evidence, it held that the penalty amount assessed against
Newell "rightly characterized Newell's [violations] as a 'High Range, Level One'
violations." Id. at 208.
363. Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1953).
and policy,364 and, therefore, an ALJ does not have the authority to
overturn the Administrator's rulemaking and policies, either directly
or simply by ignoring the rulemaking and policies.
If final decisions of the Administrator are to comply with APA
criteria and fulfill the Administrator's obligations, the Board cannot
defer to the discretion of an ALJ on matters of law and policy. On the
contrary, the Board has a duty to assure that findings and conclusions
of law and discretion in any final decision issued on behalf of the
Administrator are consistent with the rulemaking, policies and
precedent of the Administrator, and, therefore, not arbitrary,
capricious or "otherwise not in accordance with law."3 65 If findings
and conclusions of law and discretion in the initial decision of an
ALJ are consistent with the rulemaking, policies and precedent of the
Administrator, the initial decision meets the criteria of section 706 of
the APA,366 and the Board is warranted in adopting the AL's initial
decision as the final decision of the Administrator. If the initial
decision does not meet those criteria, the Board must issue a final
decision and "modify, or set aside the findings of fact and
conclusions of law or discretion contained in the decision or order
being reviewed," and it must "set forth in the final order the reasons
for its actions." 367 To fulfill its review obligations, the Board must
assure that final decisions issued on behalf of the Administrator are
consistent, and not arbitrary, capricious or "otherwise not in
accordance with law."368 To this it must be added that, once the
364. See supra note 24.
365. 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) (2000).
366. Id.
367. 40 C.F.R. § 22.30(f) (2006).
368. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). For several years the GAO has been working with
EPA in an attempt to remedy the agency's "difficulties in ensuring consistent and
equitable enforcement actions among its regions and among the states," and has
been reporting to Congress on its efforts. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office,
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement: EPA's Effort to Improve and Make
More Consistent Its Compliance and Enforcement Activities, 1 (2006) (containing
the statement of John B. Stephenson, Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,
109th Cong.). A problem area identified by the GAO has been inconsistency in the
amount of penalties assessed for noncompliance with environmental regulations.
While acknowledging the agency's efforts to address its problems, the GAO
concluded, in part, "[w]hile we applaud EPA's actions, they have thus far achieved
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Board has ruled on a given matter in a published decision of the
Administrator, that ruling becomes agency precedent, and, until such
time as the Board might revise it, that precedent "is not open to
reargument by the [ALJ]."369
The proposed standard of review clearly is supported by the
language of the federal environmental statutes 370 and the APA, 371 as
interpreted by the courts; the Administrator's Rules; 372 and the
Administrator's public pronouncement that the Board "is responsible
for assuring consistency in Agency adjudications by all of the ALJs"
and that it "assures that final decisions represent with [sic] the
position of the Agency as a whole, rather than just the position of'
one AU. 373 As the proposed standard of review arises from the
language of the statutory provisions governing the administrative
process rather than a template borrowed from the judicial process, the
only limited success and illustrate both the importance and the difficulty of
addressing the long-standing problems in ensuring the consistent application of
enforcement requirements, fines and penalties for violations of requirements." Id. at
13. It is the author's hope that, in a positive and constructive way, by revisiting the
fundamental principles of law governing the administrative process and illustrating
the need for those who participate in the process to conform with the governing
law, this article contributes to efforts being made to enable the Administrator's civil
penalty assessment process to better manifest "the consistent application of
enforcement requirements, fines and penalties for violations" of the federal
environmental statutes and regulations. When, in accordance with the
Administrator's obligations under the governing statutes, the Board takes
responsibility for the consistent interpretation and application of the
Administrator's rules and policy in his final decisions, and ALJs accept their
subordination to agency law and policy as interpreted in the Board's decisions, the
uniform law and policy applied in all cases will enable the Administrator to move
nearer to realizing the goal of consistency in his penalty assessments. Moreover,
the Administrator's enforcement staff in all regions can then look to the Board's
decisions to consistently prepare and present the Administrator's enforcement
actions, as can all parties who appear before the Administrator, knowing that the
principles of law and policy to be applied will not vary from AU to ALI, and from
case to case.
369. Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d. 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
370. See supra note 12.
371. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 706 (2000).
372. 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.27 & § 22.30 (2006).
373. Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,165 (July 23, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 22).
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consistent application of the standard will avoid the pitfall of which
Justice Frankfurter many years ago warned: failing to observe the
"vital differentiations between the functions of judicial and
administrative tribunals," and, as a consequence, "read[ing] the laws
of Congress through the distorting lenses of inapplicable legal
doctrine.,374
374. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 144 (1940).
